Giurisprudenza dei diritti individuali

Proprietà

Digest of Justinian, 1.8.2.1 (Marcian): "Quaedam naturali iure communia sunt omnium, quaedam universitatis, quaedam nullius, pleraque singulorum, quae variis ex causis cuique adquiruntur. Et quidem naturali iure omnium communia sunt illa: aer, aqua, profluens, et mare, et per hoc litora maris (Also Instit. 2.1.1)." [Some things are common to all men by ius naturale, some things belong to a community, some things belong to no one.  Many things belong to individuals who have acquired them for various reasons.  And indeed by ius naturale these things are common to all men: air, flowing water, the sea, and the shores of the sea.]

Gratian, Decretum D.1 c.7

Quid sit ius naturale. [Isidor. eod. c. 4.]

Ius naturale est commune omnium nationum, eo quod ubique instinctu nature, non constitutione aliqua habetur, ut viri et femine conjunctio, liberorum successio et educatio, communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, acquisitio eorum, quae celo, terra marique capiuntur; item deposite rei vel commendate pecuniae restitutio, violentie per vim repulsio. § 1. Nam hoc, aut si quid huic simile est, nunquam injustum, sed naturale equumque habetur.

Huguccio (ca. 1190) to D.1 c.7 v. communis omnium possessio:  De iure naturali aliquid est meum et aliquid est tuum, set de permissione, non de precepto, quia ius divinum numquam precipit omnia esse communia vel aliqua esse propria, set  permittit omnia esse communia vel aliqua esse propria, et ita de iure naturali aliquid est commune et aliquid est proprium.  "By natural law somethings are mine and other things are yours.  But this is by permission, not by command, because divine law never commanded that all things are in common or something is owned by someone.  Rather divine law permits all things to be in common and something to be owned." 

Odofredus (1250 A.D.) to Justinian's Code 7.37.3 (Bene a Zenone) (Lyon: 1480), vol. 1, unfol.: Textus:  "cum omnia principis.  Hic voluit colligere dominus Martinus quod imperator sit dominus omnium rerum singularium.  Item pro sua opinione inducit legem que dicit quod imperator potest dare predia nostra militibus ob stipendia .  .  . Set dicimus contra quia cum quis habeat rei vendicationem pro sua re.   .  .  .  Ergo imperator non habet rei vindicationem."  Here dominus Martinus wished to state that the emperor is the lord of all property.  He cited a law that asserted that the emperor can give property to the soldiers in the army.  .   .  . But we say otherwise, because anyone has the right to vindicate his property in court .  .  . the emperor cannot vindicate my property in court .  .  . "

Panormitanus, to D.1 c.7, Lucca, Biblioteca Capitolare Feliniana, 160, fol. 261r (Testo fornito da Professore Condorelli): 

Nota ibi, communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, quod de iure naturali omnia sunt communia, et idem probatur viii. dist. Quo iure (D.8 c.1), licet glosa hic exponat, que sint communia, id est communicanda necessitatis tempore. Illa tamen est impropria expositio, ut plene dixi post glosam in c. ii. supra ead. dist.  Nam ius naturale primevum non distinxit possessiones, unde possunt dici omnia communia ex quo non statuit contrarium.  

De quo dic ut latius dixi in dicto capitolo ii. Et ex hoc et ex eo subditur de libertate.

Nota quod ius naturale recepit mutationes saltem per viam additionis. Nam per constitutiones humanas bona que erant de iure naturali communia appropriantur et servitus est inducta.

Panormitanus, to D.1 c.1, Lucca, Biblioteca Capitolare Feliniana, 160, fol. 254vb:   Intellige tamen predicta prout sentit beatus Thomas in prima secunde q. XCIIII articulo V, ubi in fine dicit quod aliquid dicitur esse de iure naturali dupliciter. Uno modo, quia ad hoc natura inclinat, sicut non esse alteri iniuriam faciendam. Alio modo, quia natura non inducit contrarium, sicut possemus dicere quod hominem esse nudum de iure naturali quia natura non dedit ei vestimentum sed ars adinvenit. Et hoc modo dicit quod communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas dicitur esse de iure naturali, quia scilicet distinctio possessionum et servitus non sunt inducta a natura, sed per hominum rationem ad utilitatem humane vite, que verba diligenter nota.

Diritti del povero

Gratian, Decretum, D.8 d.a.c.1: "Differt etiam ius naturae a consuetudine et constitutione. Nam iure naturae sunt omnia communia omnibus, quod non solum inter eos servatum creditur, de quibus legitur: `Multitudinis autem credentium erat cor unum et anima una' [Acts 4:32], verum etiam ex precedenti tempore a philosophis traditum invenitur. Vnde apud Platonem illa civitas iustissime ordinata traditur in qua quisque proprios nescit affectus. Iure vero consuetudinis vel constitutionis hoc meum est, illud vero alterius." [The law of nature differs from custom and from constitution.  By natural law all things are held in common, a practice found not only among those spoken of in the Acts of the Apostles, "The multitude of believers were of one heart and mind," but in earlier times as we have learned from the philosophers.  Plato says that the most just city is one in which no one considers anything his own.  In contrast by customary law and constitutions one thing is called mine and another thing yours]

Gratian, Decretum, D.47 c.8 (Rufinus of Aquileia): "Proprium nemo dicat quod est commune, quod plusquam sufficeret sumptum etiam violenter sumptum est." [No one may call his own what is common to all.  Whatever is taken more than what is sufficient is violently taken]

Johannes Teutonicus, Commentary on Gratian's Decretum, D.47 c.8 v. commune: "idest communicandum tempore necessitatis . . . et lex dicit quod cibaria tempore necessitatis sunt omnibus communicanda." [That is things are in common in time of necessity.  The law says that food in times of necessity is common to all]

Johannes Teutonicus to D.47 c.8 v. etiam violenter: "Dicitur hic quod per violentiam dicitur auferre qui ultra necessaria sibi retinet . . . verum est si hoc fiat tempore necessitatis nam alias potest quis sibi ultra necessaria retinere." [It is said here that someone who takes more than necessary takes that violently.  That is true is it is taken in time of necessity; otherwise someone may take more than necessary]

Diritti d'immigrazione

Emanuel Gonzalez Tellez (^ 1649)

Truly the present decision is contrary to ius and natural liberty and cannot be held. For a disposition of ius that infringes upon natural liberty cannot be admitted. The present disposition infringes upon natural liberty and cannot be sustained. First we may prove the minor thesis: a disposition that anyone may not leave a certain place or a certain city infringes upon natural liberty. [Verum praesens decisio ut juri et naturali libertati contraria, sustineri nequit; nam juris dispositio, per quam infringitur naturalis libertas, admitti non debet, sed praesens dispositio infringit naturalem libertatem, igitur sustineri non debet. Probatur minor, nam dispositio ut quis a tali loco vel civitate non recedat, infringit naturalem libertatem]

Contratti

Guido of Suzara (1290) Suppletiones to Dig. 1.3.31(30) (Princeps legibus), Clm 6201, fol. 10v:  Quid si princeps pactum faciat cum aliquo, teneturne servare ut possit conveniri ex contractu quem inivit cum aliquo?  Et videtur quod non teneatur servare, nec possit conveniri, arg. huius legis, quia hic dicitur ipsum esse legibus solutum legibus.  .   .   . Econtra videtur quod princeps debeat servare contractus quos facit cum aliquo quia contractus iuris gentium sunt.   What if the prince makes a contract with a subject, is he held to honor the contract if he is summoned to court?  It seems that he is not bound to observe a summons since he is "legibus solutus."  .  .  .  Nevertheless, the prince is bound to honor a contract because a contract is a part of the ius gentium.  The prince cannot derogate  that right,  since the right is immutable.

Guido of Suzara (1290) to Cod. 1.14(17).4 (Digna vox), Paris, B.N. lat. 4489, fol. 33v:  Nota quod si imperator facit pacem cu aliqua civitate seu cum aliquod comite vel barone, et ineat aliqua pacta teneretur ea observare, nec potest venire contra vel ea infringere.  .   . Item nec pacta facta per suos antecessores potest infringere  .  .  .  Nec obstat quod dicitur quod par in parem non habet imperium   .  .  . quod imperator dum vivit parem non habet, et successor suus heres habet servare facta predecessorum. Note that if the emperor makes peace with any city or with any count or baron, and enters into any agreements, he is bound to observe them; he cannot contravene nor break them .  .  . He also cannot break agreements that his predecessors made .  .  . The maxim, an equal cannot have authority does not apply in this case  .  .  . because the emperor does not have an equal as long as he lives, and a successor, his own heir, has to preserve the arrangements of his predecessors.