A Jurisprudence of Individual Rights
Property, Contract, Self-Defense, Marriage
Right to Property
Digest of Justinian, 220.127.116.11 (Marcian): "Quaedam naturali iure communia sunt omnium, quaedam universitatis, quaedam nullius, pleraque singulorum, quae variis ex causis cuique adquiruntur. Et quidem naturali iure omnium communia sunt illa: aer, aqua, profluens, et mare, et per hoc litora maris (Also Instit. 2.1.1)." [Some things are common to all men by ius naturale, some things belong to a community, some things belong to no one. Many things belong to individuals who have acquired them for various reasons. And indeed by ius naturale these things are common to all men: air, flowing water, the sea, and the shores of the sea.]
Odofredus (1250 A.D.) to Justinian's Code 7.37.3 (Bene a Zenone) (Lyon: 1480), vol. 1, unfol.: "Here Martinus wished to state that the emperor is the lord of all property. He cited a law that asserted that the emperor can give property to the soldiers in the army. . . . But we say otherwise, because anyone has the right to vindicate his property in court . . . the emperor cannot vindicate my property in court . . .
Right to Survival
Gratian, Decretum, D.8 d.a.c.1: "Differt etiam ius naturae a consuetudine et constitutione. Nam iure naturae sunt omnia communia omnibus, quod non solum inter eos servatum creditur, de quibus legitur: `Multitudinis autem credentium erat cor unum et anima una' [Acts 4:32], verum etiam ex precedenti tempore a philosophis traditum invenitur. Vnde apud Platonem illa civitas iustissime ordinata traditur in qua quisque proprios nescit affectus. Iure vero consuetudinis vel constitutionis hoc meum est, illud vero alterius." [The law of nature differs from custom and from constitution. By natural law all things are held in common, a practice found not only among those spoken of in the Acts of the Apostles, "The multitude of believers were of one heart and mind," but in earlier times as we have learned from the philosophers. Plato says that the most just city is one in which no one considers anything his own. In contrast by customary law and constitutions one thing is called mine and another thing yours]
Gratian, Decretum, D.47 c.8 (Rufinus of Aquileia): "Proprium nemo dicat quod est commune, quod plusquam sufficeret sumptum etiam violenter sumptum est." [No one may call his own what is common to all. Whatever is taken more than what is sufficient is violently taken]
Johannes Teutonicus, Commentary on Gratian's Decretum, D.47 c.8 v. commune: "idest communicandum tempore necessitatis . . . et lex dicit quod cibaria tempore necessitatis sunt omnibus communicanda." [That is things are in common in time of necessity. The law says that food in times of necessity is common to all]
Johannes Teutonicus to D.47 c.8 v. etiam violenter: "Dicitur hic quod per violentiam dicitur auferre qui ultra necessaria sibi retinet . . . verum est si hoc fiat tempore necessitatis nam alias potest quis sibi ultra necessaria retinere." [It is said here that someone who takes more than necessary takes that violently. That is true is it is taken in time of necessity; otherwise someone may take more than necessary]
Right to Freedom of Movement
Emanuel Gonzalez Tellez (^ 1649)
Truly the present decision is contrary to ius and natural liberty and cannot be held. For a disposition of ius that infringes upon natural liberty cannot be admitted. The present disposition infringes upon natural liberty and cannot be sustained. First we may prove the minor thesis: a disposition that anyone may not leave a certain place or a certain city infringes upon natural liberty. [Verum praesens decisio ut juri et naturali libertati contraria, sustineri nequit; nam juris dispositio, per quam infringitur naturalis libertas, admitti non debet, sed praesens dispositio infringit naturalem libertatem, igitur sustineri non debet. Probatur minor, nam dispositio ut quis a tali loco vel civitate non recedat, infringit naturalem libertatem]
Individual Rights in Contracts
Guido of Suzara (1290) Suppletiones to Dig. 1.3.31(30) (Princeps legibus), Clm 6201, fol. 10v: What if the prince makes a contract with a subject, is he held to honor the contract if he is summoned to court? It seems that he is not bound to observe a summons since he is "legibus solutus." . . . Nevertheless, the prince is bound to honor a contract because a contract is a part of the ius gentium. The prince cannot derogate that right, since the right is immutable.
Guido of Suzara (1290) to Cod. 1.14(17).4 (Digna vox), Paris, B.N.
lat. 4489, fol. 33v: Note that if the emperor makes peace with any city or with any
count or baron, and enters into any agreements, he is bound to observe them; he cannot
contravene nor break them . . . He also cannot break agreements that his
predecessors made . . . The maxim, an equal cannot have authority does not
apply in this case . . . because the emperor does not have an equal as
long as he lives, and a successor, his own heir, has to preserve the arrangements of his
Individual' s right of consent, Parental consent no longer necessary; Equality of the man and woman, Ius coniugale