© A version of this essay was published in Medieval Latin: An Introduction and Bibliographical Guide, edd. F.A.C. Mantello and A.G. Rigg (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press of America, 1996) 254-266

Roman and Secular Law in the Middle Ages

By Kenneth Pennington

The language of medieval legal Latin creates significant problems for the modern reader. Law is a technical subject with a specialized vocabulary defining practices, procedures, and terms that no longer can be translated into modern languages. The institutions that put law into practice have often completely disappeared, and when we read legal texts, we may have little understanding of commonplaces that the writers of the texts took for granted. Although the syntax of legal Latin is not especially difficult or different from other branches of learning, the concepts, terminology, and formulas can be formidable barriers for the reader. This chapter will concentrate on the special problems that confront readers of medieval Roman and secular law texts.

Ancient Roman law is the bedrock upon which medieval law is built. It influenced and shaped the legal compilations of the early Middle Ages, and with its resurrection in the late eleventh century, it furnished the core of academic law that was taught at the university. Learned jurists carried its doctrines to the far reaches of Europe. Consequently, a student of medieval legal Latin who wishes to read legal texts must have some understanding of Roman law vocabulary as interpreted by medieval jurists.

The resurrection of Roman law at the end of the eleventh century was a unique event in legal history and changed the future of European law. Shadowy figures with unusual names like Pepo and Irnerius began to teach the law of the ancient Romans at Bologna. The law that they taught was late imperial law that had been compiled by the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century. This codification, the Corpus iuris civilis, yielded the material for teaching Roman law in the eleventh century. Its doctrines provided medieval jurists with a sophisticated model for contracts, rules of procedure, family law, testaments, and a strong monarchical constitutional system. Six hundred years after his death, Justinian's name became eponymous for legislator and codifier.

Legal historians have differed whether jurists at Pavia or at Bologna began the revival of Roman law. Research over the past twenty years has demonstrated conclusively that the jurists in Bologna recovered the key text of Roman law, the Digest, in stages during the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. These Bolognese jurists were the first to recognize the importance of the Digest, and, like their Humanist successors in the fifteenth century, they must have searched for manuscripts copies of it. Wolfgang P. Müller's recent essay on the recovery of the Digest sums up the stages of this development [1].

With canon law, Roman law formed the medieval common law, the ius commune of Western Europe. To separate the two legal systems is artificial and even misleading. Both laws were taught in law schools throughout Christendom, students studied both laws as a part of their legal education, and the medieval jurisprudence can only be understood with a knowledge of each. The vocabulary and structures of Roman and canon law shaped academic and secular law. Although we shall concentrate on Roman and secular law in this chapter, the reader should bear in mind that these two legal systems are just a part of the ius commune, and the terminology and concepts that we shall examine are not exclusively their own.

The first task of those wishing to explore medieval ius commune is to learn the structure of the classical and medieval Corpus of Roman law and to master to the forms of citation used by the medieval jurists. Justinian's codification had consisted of four parts: the Institutes, an introduction to Roman law originally written for first year law students, the Codex, containing imperial legislation from the second to the sixth century, the Digest, a compilation of excerpts from the writings of the Roman jurists, and finally, the Novellae, a compilation of Justinian's legislation.

The Digest was of fundamental importance for understanding the intricacies of Roman law. The excerpts from the Roman jurisconsults defined terms, discussed theoretical difficulties, cited court cases, and made the mass of legislation found in the Codex understandable and, therefore, usable. Without the Digest Roman law would have had little influence for European legal systems of the Middle Ages.

The medieval Digest and Codex, like Justinian's codification, are divided into books, the books then subdivide into titles and each title contains subchapters of excerpts of the Roman jurisconsults (Digest) or laws (Codex). However, the format of the medieval Corpus iuris civilis, known as the Littera Bononensis, was quite different from Justinian's codification. Since the Digest was not recovered in one piece, the early teachers of law, called glossators because they "glossed" their texts, divided the Digest into three sections: Digestum vetus, corresponding to Book one, title one, law one to Book 24, title two (in modern citation Dig. 1.1.1 to Dig. 24.2), Infortiatum, Dig. 24.3 to 38.17, Digestum novum, Dig. 39.1 to 50.17. The Codex was separated into two parts, books 1 through 9 and books 10 to 12. The other important difference between the medieval and classical text was that the Novellae were ordered very differently from Justinian's arrangement. The various titles were placed in nine "collationes" and the entire work was called the Authenticum.

The medieval and early modern jurists cited the Digest with the sign "ff." We do not know why they used this abbreviation. They followed this sign with an abbreviated title --- sometimes radically abbreviated --- e.g. de sep. vi. (de sepulchro violato), followed by either the abbreviation for lex, l., and a Roman number or the Latin incipit of the law, e.g. l.iii. or just the incipit of the lex, e.g. Praetor ait (Dig. 47.12.3). A few examples of medieval citations to the Digest followed by the modern notation illustrate the jurists' method:

ut ff. de legat. iii. l.i. § Si filius = Dig. 32.1.103(102).2

ut ff. de testamen. mil. l. In fraudem § finali = Dig. 29.1.15(16).6

ut ff. de regul. iuris Cum principalis = Dig. 50.17.178(139)

The numbers in parentheses indicate the divergence of the medieval Digest from the classical text. The medieval vulgate version of the Digest and the Code distributed their titles within books and their chapters within titles slightly differently from the classical text. Consequently, both the classical and medieval arrangement should be given when referring to a text. In the examples above and below, the numbers in parentheses refer to the medieval position of a title or a lex.

The Codex was cited by C. using the same format as citations to the Digest. The text of the medieval Code was enriched by selections from the Novellae that the jurists placed under appropriate titles. Consequently, two forms of citation are found for references to the Code:

ut C. de sacrosan. eccl. l. prima = Cod. 1.2(5).1

ut C. de legibus l. Digna vox = Cod. 1.14(17).4

ut C. de iud. authen. Ad hec = post Cod. 3.1.5 (ex Nov. 60.2)

The last citation indicates to the reader that under the title "De iudiciis," after the fifth law, the jurists inserted an excerpt from the Novels of Justinian with the beginning words "Ad hec."

Citations to the Institutiones and the Authenticum (the medieval arrangement of the Novellae) were signaled by inst. and auth. respectively. Usually the jurists referred to the Authenticum by citing the title and the "collatio" in which a law was found:

ut inst. de act. § i. = Instit. 4.6.1

ut in auth. de eccles. tit. § Si quis in sua, coll. ix. = Auth. 9.6. (Nov. 131).8

To help a reader look up a particular text, the modern reference should always include the number of the Novellae from which the Authentica was taken. The medieval Authenticum has not been printed since the early seventeenth century, and a particular text is usually most easily read in the standard edition of Justinian's Corpus iuris civilis[2].

The most convenient way to verify citations to the entire Corpus iuris civilis is to use the index published by Ugo Nicolini and Franca Sinatti d'Amico[3]. Ochoa also published an index to the Corpus, but he did not, as Nicolini and d'Amico do, always note the differences between the medieval vulgate text and Justinian's codification[4].

Although there is not a complete concordance, there are a number of reference books that are helpful for finding material in the Corpus iuris civilis. To locate particular words or concepts in the Digest, the Vocabularium iurisprudentiae Romanae is of great value[5]. A similar work provides the same information for the Codex[6]. There is a complete concordance of the Novellae[7]. A convenient dictionary of the most important terms used in Roman law is Emil Seckel's revised edition of Heumann's Handlexikon zu den Quellen des roemischen Rechts[8]. Berger's Dictionary of Roman Law is useful for defining terms but does not give references to where one may find the pertinent material[9]. There is not, unfortunately, a comprehensive dictionary for medieval Latin legal terms. The Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichteis a valuable reference tool for the most important medieval legal terms[10].

Early Germanic Customary Law  

Map of the First Germanic Kingdoms

Map of Germanic Kingdoms at the time of Justinian

Armed with a foundation of Roman law, the reader of medieval Latin legal texts can turn to secular law. In the early Middle Ages the Germanic kingdoms compiled books of the customary law of the folk. The early Germanic kings created two separate legal systems for their Roman and German subjects. In its most primitive form, Germanic law was personal and transcended territorial boundaries. Roman law, like modern legal systems, was territorial. By the end of the seventh century, European law no longer recognized a distinction between Romans and Germans, and single legal systems emerged in the kingdoms of Europe[.

Germanic law was forged and tempered by Roman law, and process of assimilation began very early. The first compilations of law made by the Germanic tribes that overran the Western provinces of the Roman Empire drew heavily upon Roman law, which influenced the shape and contents of these compilations of customary law. The vocabulary and doctrines of Roman law can be found in almost every compilation of Germanic law.

Germanic Law had several significant elements that influenced later European legal systems:

1. An adversarial procedural system:  The Ordeal

2. The importance of the oath in procedure:  Compurgation

3. Law was personal, not territorial.  Led to many customary codes in kingdoms and principalities.

During the sixth and seventh centuries, the Visigoths, Ostrogoths, Burgundians, Salian Franks, [Salian Frankish Law Complete]Frisians, Saxons, Lombards, and other tribes committed their unwritten law to written codes. Although the rulers who commanded that these compilations be made were not legislating in the modern sense of the word, they were not bereft of any sense of law-making. A decision of the royal Burgundian court was incorporated into the Burgundian Code stipulating that "the judgment attain the authority of perpetual law:"

Quotiens huiusmodi causae consurgunt, de quibus nihil praecedentium legum statuta iusserunt, ita ambiguitatem rei oportet absolvi, ut emissum iudicium perpetuae legis robur accipiat, et specialis causa generalem teneat aequitatem.  [How many times do cases arise in which the statutes of previous laws do not resolve the ambiguity of the case?  Therefore receive a rendered opinion of the court that will have the status of perpetual law so that a special case may hold general equity].

The idea that a judgment of a court could set a precedent was a concept of Roman law, and, not surprisingly, this section of the Code is replete with Romanisms: "legum statuta," "iudicium," and "perpetuae legis robor." Although the text might, at first glance, seem to articulate a theory of legislation, such an interpretation would be seriously misleading. The author of the text has incorporated Roman law terminology with little understanding of technical concepts. "Statuta legum" is a redundancy that no Roman lawyer would have committed. "Emissum iudicium," in this case the "rendered opinion of the court," might attain the "authority of perpetual law," but a classical Roman lawyer would have formulated his language and thought very differently. A Roman jurist would not have created new law from a court decision, but from an imperial rescript (a response to a legal question) or from an imperial constitution.

Legislation under Charles the Great (Charlemagne)

Carolingian monarchs were much more active promulgating law that in some ways approximated modern legislation. Charlemagne brought political and legal unity to his realm. In his biography of Charlemagne, Einhard wrote that the king wanted to reform Frankish law and mandated that the laws of all nations under his jurisdiction should be written down. He issued a x-large number of administrative and legislative commands that, because they were divided into chapters, are called "capitularies." These documents regulated secular and ecclesiastical affairs in his kingdom and were promulgated by missi dominici. The Capitulary of Herstal (779) contained a series of executive orders that mixed ecclesiastical and secular concerns. Charlemagne ordered bishops to be subject to their metropolitans and priests to their bishops, but, within the same capitulary, he regulated the penalties for murderers, robbers, and perjurers. In chapter nine of the Capitulary of Herstal, the king ordered his vassals to render justice and deprived them of their offices if they did not:

Ut latrones de infra immunitatem illi iudicis ad comitum placita praesentetur; et qui hoc non fecerit, beneficium et honorem perdat. Similiter et vassus noster, si hoc non adimpleverit, beneficium et honorem perdat; et qui beneficium non habuerit, bannum solvat[13].

The language of the Capitulary contains a number of terms that would become a part of feudal law --- "beneficium," "placitum," "vassus," and "bannum." Yet this terminology would mean something quite different in the twelfth century, and the reader should not assume that the meaning of words did not change between the eighth and twelfth centuries. "Placitum" means a plea or pleading in later law; the term is foreign to Roman law. In the above text, it should not be translated as a "pleas," but as "the determination of the count." In later law "beneficium" could mean a gift or a fief ("feudum" is another word for fief). Here, however, it means office. "Vassus" is "vassal" in feudal law, but a "vassus" in the Carolingian period is someone dependent upon a lord, without the contractual implications of the feudal "vassus." Charlemagne's capitulary illustrates the difficulties of translating early medieval documents with classical or later medieval legal definitions.

Legislation of the Italian City States

The Italian communes compiled or promulgated their own statutes beginning in the twelfth century. These texts and their language were shaped by the law of the ius commune and local Italian practice. The northern Italian city states were the most precocious. Genoa published its first statutes in 1143, Pisa in 1162, Piacenza in 1135. The most prosperous and important city on the Lombard plain, Milan, issued its first known statute in 1170. A compilation of Milanese laws was issued in 1216, the Liber consuetudinum Mediolani. The statutes of the city states often present a patchwork of terminology taken from the ius commune and local customary law. A passage from the statutes of Milan regulating trials by battle ("pugna") exemplifies this colorful mixture:

In aliis ergo casibus fit pugna, veluti in furto sicut dictum est. In schacho similiter. De incendio quoque et guasto fit pugna, veluti si blavam in agris quis guastasse vel vites taliasse vel arbores scorticasse dicatur et damnum fuerit solidorum sex vel plurium[14].

"Pugna" was completely unknown to Roman law. Roman jurists distinguished between "furtum" and "rapina" (theft and theft with violence). Here the jurists who drafted this passage incorporated "furtum" into the text, but substituted an Italianism, "schachum" for "rapina." "Guastum" is an Italian spelling for "vastum." "Damnum" is a technical term for the loss or expenditure incurred by the plaintiff in a legal case.

English Law

The great English treatise on law of the thirteenth century that is commonly attributed to Bracton presents a different challenge to the reader. Although Bracton's treatise is replete with allusions to the ius commune, his king was quite different from the prince of the learned law. Anyone who interprets Bracton by assuming that he knew the Roman law to which he referred will be misled. Although Bracton knew some Roman and canon law, the doctrines of kingship in those legal systems did not shape his constitutional thought. He applied learned law to English jurisprudence like a thin veneer that never transforms its unsophisticated core:

Temperet igitur potentiam suam per legem quae frenum est potentiae, quod secundum leges vivat, quod hoc sanxit lex humana quod leges suum ligent latorem, et alibi in eadem, digna vox maiestate regnantis est legibus, scilicet alligatum se principem profiteri. Item nihil tam proprium est imperii quam legibus vivere, et maius imperio est legibus submittere principatum, et merito debet retribuere legi quod lex tribuit ei, facit enim lex quod ipse sit rex[15].

In this passage, Bracton refers to one of the most influential texts of Roman law that was a key problem of interpretion for the ius commune, Digna vox (Cod. 1.14[17].4). Digna voxadmonished the prince to respect the law, and medieval jurists spilled much ink interpreting this constitution. No jurist of the ius commune, however, would have concluded that the "law makes the king." Bracton uses the terminology of the ius commune and even quotes the wording of Digna vox, but he understands law very differently from a contemporary academic jurist. "Law makes the king" is a concept that violated a central tenet of contemporary jurisprudential thought. The jurists had recently evolved a doctrine of sovereignty that affirmed the opposite: "The king's will is the source of all law." The terms in this passage, "lator," "imperium," "maiestas," and "principatum" are terms taken from the ius commune, and they describe a conception of monarchical authority that Bracton did not understand or endorse. If the modern reader reads Bracton's paragraph on kingship with the supposition that he employs the technical terminology of the ius commune with sophistication, the unwary reader will be seriously misled. Bracton's "imperium" and "principatum" are not the powers of the "prince" as found in the pages of the Corpus iuris civilis. Bracton's English king exercised limited, circumscribed power; the ius commune could not accurately define his authority.

English, French, Italian and other secular legal systems were not an academic disciplines during the Middle Ages. Consequently, we have very few commentaries on secular legal systems like Bracton's.

Role of the Jurists in the Ius commune

The most significant accomplishment of the ius commune the Middle Ages was the intense literary activity of the jurists. From the twelfth to the fifteenth century they explored every nook and cranny of Justinian's Corpus iuris civilis and produced a massive legacy of juristic writings. They interpreted Roman law by writing glosses (comments on individual words or phrases), commentaries and summas (an extended analysis of a law book, title, or law), questions (disputations on legal points held as academic exercises), consilia (briefs written for an actual case). The first principle that students of juristic Latin must constantly bear in mind is that when the jurists wrote their glosses, commentaries, questions, summas, and consilia, they cited not just the texts of law but also intended that the reader consult the glosses and commentaries of other jurists to the same texts[16]. A passage on the constitution Digna vox by Guido of Suzzara demonstrates how the jurists wove their thought around the texts of Roman law and the commentaries of others:

Nota quod si imperator facit pacem cum aliqua ciuitate seu cum aliquo comite uel barone, et ineat aliqua pacta, teneretur ea obseruare, nec potest uenire contra uel ea infringere, ut hic et qui testa. fac. pos. l. Si quis (Cod. 6.22.6) et de testa. l. Ex imperfecto (Cod. 6.23.3) Item nec pacta facta per suos antecessores potest infringere, ut infra de testa. milit. l. Que a patre (Cod. 2.51.7) et de rebus alien. uel non alien. l. Venditrici (Cod. 4.51.3).

Nec obstat quod dicitur quod par in parem non habet imperium, ut ff. de iniur. Nec magistratibus (Dig. 47.10.32) et ad Trebell. Ille a quo § Tempestiuum (Dig. 36.1.13.4) quod imperator dum uiuit parem non habet, et successor suus heres habet seruare facta predecessorum ut dictum est. Guido [17].

A careful analysis of the texts of Roman law with which Guido supported his description of princely authority would puzzle a modern reader. A reading of the constitutions from the Codex, "Si quis" and "Ex imperfecto testamento," would not immediately convince a modern reader that the emperor was bound by his treaties and contracts. The connection between the two constitutions and Guido's conclusion would seem tenuous at best. However, Guido cited much more than just two imperial constitutions. He referred to a century of commentaries written on them in which the jurists had developed a doctrine that the prince was limited by his contract. The result of their work was a doctrine that shackled the authority of the prince to break contracts. Guido's allegation of the two constitutions was a shorthand reference to this body of writing. The main point is that to understand the jurisprudence of the ius commune, the jurists cannot be read out of context.

When Guido referred to one of the basic principles of medieval theories of sovereignty in the second part of his gloss, "par in parem imperium non habet" (an equal cannot exercise power and jurisdiction over an equal), he did not just buttress his allegation only with the two citations to the Digest, but also with the commentaries on them. Again, if modern readers would read only the texts of the Digest that Guido cited, they would not understand how Guido arrived at his conclusions. "Par in parem" defined the authority of a ruler to change, promulgate, or abolish law in the jurisprudence of the Ius commune. "Nec magistratibus" and "Tempestiuum" were two of the loci classici where the jurists discussed this doctrine of legislative sovereignty.

After the twelfth century, the testimony of witnesses in legal cases was commonly recorded in writing. These records are of great value for information about legal procedure, practice, and vocabulary. A court case from 1289 illustrates the shaky grammar and syntax of these documents.

Faciollus Bonvezini testis iuratus ut supra et prelecto sibi capitulo primo dixit hic testis, "bene erat dictus Petrus sub porticu suo." Interrogatus super secundo, dixit hic testis, "bene exiverat dictus Petrus extra domum suam caussa urinandi." Interrogatus si ipse habitat in domo una cum dicto Petro, nec si ipse audivit dicere dictus Petrus, "ego vollo ire extra domum caussa urinandi," respondit, "non audivi dicere." Interrogatus qua de caussa dixit quod ipse bene venerit extra domum caussa urinandi, respondit "quia vidi ipsum urinare et non aliter scio."[18]

The spelling is typical of Italian texts of this period. The syntax is characteristic of spoken Latin. "Dictus Petrus" in the passage should be "dictum Petrum" if it were to conform to proper Latin grammar. But these texts convey a simple immediacy that more formal texts never achieve.

The technical terminology of judicial procedure can be a formidable barrier to understanding legal texts, since the language of the court can be arcane. A twelfth-century book on procedure describes basic terminology:

Actor est qui persequitur aliquid principaliter dicens rem suam esse vel personam obligatam ad aliquid dandum vel faciendum. Sed et reus si intentione adversarii fundata exceptionem ponit, ut condempnationem effugiat, actor intelligur. Agere enim is videtur, qui exceptione utitur[19].

"Actor" is the plaintiff who brings his complaint to court. "Reus" can be, as in this case, translated as "defendant," but it can also mean some who has been convicted of a crime. An "exceptio" is a defendant's response to an accusation of the plaintiff, which, if true, might exhonerate the defendant. "Agere" has several meanings. It can mean to assert a right in court or to pursue a legal action by means of the "ordo iudiciarius" (the technical term for the rules of court procedure).

The law did not countenance elegant variation, and the jurists consistently use the same vocabulary to define a legal situation. A plaintiff had the obligation to "probare" (prove) his case. The defendant was summoned (convenire) before the court.

Actore enim non probante, qui convenitur, etsi nichil praestiterit, obtineat, quia rei favorabiliores sunt quam actores[19].

The jurists formulated general legal principles in language that was not always crystal clear. In this case, the jurist wished to define the principle that "if the plaintiff did not prove his case, the defendant would be acquitted."

In describing the judicial process, ordinary words can assume technical meanings:

Quod si ex inquisitione ipsa leves personae aliquae de homicidio ipso notentur, licet per eam contra ipsos non probetur ad plenum, ad tormenta ipsarum levium et vilium personarum postremo decernimus descendendum[20].

A "levis persona" is not an insignificant person, but a base or infamous one. In this context "notentur" means to blame or implicate. "Ad plenum" is a technical expression that indicates a "full proof" (plena probatio). "Tormenta" is torture. Another Roman law expression for torture is "quaestio." Finally, "inquisitio" has none of the sinister overtones the word has in English; it should be translated as "judicial investigation" or "judicial process."

This brief survey of legal terminology can only indicate the complexity of juristic Latin. An inexperienced translator of these texts must not assume that a familiar word is not a technical term in law. Even distinguished translators of medieval Latin legal texts can nod. One translated "Auditis igitur atque perpensis criminalis negotii meritis" as "Since the deserts of a criminal case which is pending . . . have been heard and considered." "Meritum" can mean "desert" in classical Latin, but in law it means "the essential issues of the case." The phrase is formulaic and should be translated: "Having heard and examined the issues of the criminal case . . . " The error is minor but does illustrate a pit into which even a scholar can fall. Bibliography

Works Cited

1. Wolfgang P. Müller, "The Recovery of Justinian's Digest in the Middle Ages," BMCL 20 (1990) 1-29.

2. Corpus iuris civilis. Edd. P. Krueger, W. Kunkel, R. Schoell. 3 Vols. Dublin-Zürich: Weidmann, 1872-1988 (Reprinted many times).

3. Hugone Nicolini and Franca Sinatti d'Amico, Indices corporis iuris civilis iuxta vetustiores editiones cum criticis collatas. 1: Index titulorum. 2: Index legum. 3. Index paragraphorum. 5 Vols. Milan: Giuffrè, 1964-1970.

4. Xaverio Ochoa and Aloisio Diez, Indices titulorum et legum Corporis iuris civilis. Rome: Commentarium pro Religiosis, 1965.

5. Vocabularium iurisprudentiae Romanae (5 Volumes. Berlin: 1903-1939).

6. Vocabularium Codicis Iustiniani, ed. Robert Mayr (2 volumes; Prague: 1923, reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965).

7. Novellae, Pars Latina: Legum Iustiniani Imperatoris vocabularium, ed. G.G. Archi and A.M. Colombo (11 volumes; Milano: 1977).

8. H. Heumann, Handlexikon zu den Quellen des roemischen Rechts Ed. Emil Seckel (9th ed. Jena: 1914).

9. Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 43; Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1953).

10. Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte. 3 Vols. Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 1964-.

11. Kenneth Pennington, "Medieval Law." Medieval Studies: An Introduction. Ed. James M. Powell. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992: 333-352, gives a brief description of the sources of early medieval law.

12. L.R. De Salis, Leges Burgundionum (MGH, Leges nationum Germanicarum, 1.2.1, Hannover: 1892), pp. 85-87.

13. Capitularia regum Francorum. Edd. A. Boretius and V. Krause (MGH, Leges, Hannover: 1883) Vol. I, nr. 20.

14. Liber consuetudinum mediolani anni MCCXVI. Edd. E. Besta and G.L. Barni (Milan: 1949), pp. 95-96.

15. Henry de Bracton, Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England. Edited and translated by Samuel E. Thorne. 4 Vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968-1977: 305.

16. Pennington, "Medieval Law," 340-346, for a brief discussion of the literary activity of the jurists.

17. Guido of Suzzara, Suppletiones to Cod. 1.14(17).4 (Digna vox), Paris, B.N. lat. 4489, fol. 33v.

18. Albertus Gandinus und das Strafrecht der Scholastik, ed. H. U. Kantorowicz (Berlin: 1907), p. 292.

19. Quellen zur Geschichte des römisch-kanonischen Processes im Mittelalter. Ed. L. Wahrmund (Innsbruck: 1925) Vol. 4, part 1, pp. 3-5.

20. Die Konstitutionen Friedrichs II. von Hohenstaufen für sein Königreich Sizilien, nach einer lateinischen Handschrift des 13. Jahrhunderts herausgegeben und übersetzt. Edd. H. Conrad, T. von der Lieck-Buyken, and W. Wagner (Studien und Quellen zur Welt Friedrichs II., 2. Cologne-Vienna: 1973), pp. 40-42. General Works

Secular Law, Sources (Latin): Armin Wolf, "Die Gesetzgebung der entstehenden Territorialstaaten." Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte: 1. Mittelalter (1100-1500): Die gelehrten Rechte und Die Gesetzgebung. München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1973: 517-800. Wolf's essay is of fundamental importance for the creation and codification of secular law in Western Europe from ca. 1100 to 1500. He lists all the printed editions for secular European codes in the national monarchies and in the Italian city states. Henry de Bracton, Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England. Edited and translated by Samuel E. Thorne. 4 Volumes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968-1977. Ranulf de Glanville, The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commonly Called Glanvill. Edited and translated by George D.G. Hall. London: 1965. An extensive collection of early medieval legal materials can be found in the volumes of Monumenta Germaniae Historica = MGH in its various series:

Leges (in folio), 5 Volumes. Leges Alamanorum, Langobardum, Saxonum, 1835-1889. Leges nationum Germanicarum, 6 Volumes. Leges Visigothorum, Burgundionum, Saxonum, Thuringorum, Frisionum, Chamavorum, Alamanorum, Longobardorum. Lex Romana Raetica Curiensis, Ribvaria, Salica, Baivariorum, 1888-1969. Capitularia regum Francorum, 2 Volumes. 1883-1897. Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum, 11 Volumes. 1893-1988. Fontes iuris Germanici antiqui, 6 Volumes. 1955-1974. Fontes iuris Germanici antiqui in usum scholarum separatim editi, 14 Volumes. 1869-1989. Katherine Fischer Drew has translated The Burgundian Code. Philadelphia: 1972, The Lombard Laws. Philadelphia: 1973 (in which she provides a glossary of terms), and The Laws of the Salian Franks. Philadelphia: 1991. Theodore John Rivers provides a glossary of terms for Germanic law in Laws of the Alamans and Bavarians. Philadelphia: 1977. Frederick II's Liber Augustalis or Constitutions of Melfi has been translated by James M. Powell. Syracuse: 1971.

Studies: Manlio Bellomo, L"Europa del diritto comune. 2nd Ed. Rome: Il Cigno Galilei, 1989. A lucid and comprehensive survey of medieval secular and learned law in the Middle Ages that will soon be translated into English (Catholic University Press of America). Heinrich Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte. 2 Volumes. 2nd Edition by C.F. von Schwerin. 1928, reprinted 1961. Katherine Fischer Drew, "Law, German: Early Codes." DMA 7 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1986) 468-477. Drew lists English translations of Germanic codes in bibliography. Gérard Giordanengo, Le droit féodal dans les pays de droit écrit: L'exemple de la Provence et du Dauphiné XIIe-début XIV siècle. Bibliothèques des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 266. Rome: 1988. An excellent survey of feudal law in France. Karl Kroeschell, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte. 2 Volumes. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982. S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law. 2nd Edition. London: Butterworths, 1981. Henry A. Myers, "Law, German: Post-Carolingian." DMA 7 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1986) 477-483. Kenneth Pennington, "Law Codes: 1000-1500." DMA 7 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1986) 425-431. Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I. Revised by S.F.C. Milsom. 2 Volumes. 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Charles Radding, The Origins of Medieval Jurisprudence: Pavia and Bologna, 850-1150. New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1988 is a work that ignores most of the secondary literature of the past 25 years and does not grapple with the textual tradition of the Digest. Radding's thesis that the school of Pavia was more important for the revival of Roman law than that of Bologna is untenable; it has been convincingly refuted by Wolfgang P. Müller (see note 1, above). Kathryn Reyerson and John Bell Henneman, "Law, French: In South." DMA 7 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1986) 461-468. Teofilo Ruiz, "Law, Spanish." DMA 7 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1986) 518-524. Joseph R. Strayer, "Law, French: In North." DMA 7 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1986) 457-460. R.C. Van Caenegem, The Birth of the English Common Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Peter Weimar, "Die Handschriften des Liber feudorum und seiner Glossen." Rivista internazionale di diritto comune 1 (1990) 31-98. The most important work on the development of feudal law in the last 50 years. A guide to the sources and commentaries.

Roman Law, Sources (Latin): The medieval vulgate text of the Corpus iuris civilis has never been edited in modern times. Pietro Torelli began an edition in the 1930's of which a small part of the Institutes with Accursius's Ordinary Gloss was published in 1939: Accursii Florentini glossa ad Instititiones Iustiniani imperatoris <Liber I>. Bologna: 1939. The vulgate text was published repeatedly from the beginning of printing in the fifteenth century to the early seventeenth. Almost all these editions also have the Ordinary Gloss of Accursius added to the margins. Theodor Mommsen and Paul Krueger published the modern edition of Justinian's codification with an extensive apparatus of variants in the late nineteenth century: Digesta Iustiniani Augusti. Berlin: Weidmann, 1870 and Codex Iustinianus. Berlin: Weidmann, 1877. A streamlined version of this edition, including the Institutes and Novellae, was published in 1872-1895 and has been kept in print with many reprint editions Dublin-Zürich: Weidmann, 1872 to present. A complete facsimile edition of the Codex Florentinus has been published in 2 volumes by A. Corbino and B. Santalucia, edd. Justiniani Augusti Pandectarum codex florentinus. Florence: 1988. Helmut Coing, ed. Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte: 1. Mittelalter (1100-1500): Die gelehrten Rechte und Die Gesetzgebung. München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1973. This work is the first comprehensive survey of medieval Roman law since Savigny and lists the printed and reprinted editions of all the medieval civilians. Max Conrat (Cohn), Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des römischen Rechte im früheren Mittelalter. Leipzig: 1891. Reprinted Aalen: Scientia, 1963. Gero Dolezalek, Repertorium manuscriptorum veterum Codicis Justiniani. With Laurent Mayali. 2 Volumes. Repertorien zur Frühzeit der gelehrten Rechte, Ius Commune, Sonderhefte 23. Frankfurt am Main: Vittoria Klostermann, 1985 and Verzeichnis der Handschriften zum römischen Recht bis 1600. 4 Volumes. Frankfurt am Main: Max-Planck-Institut für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte, 1972. Dolezalek's volumes are an invaluable introduction to the manuscripts of Roman law. Linda Fowler-Magerl, Ordo iudiciorum vel ordo iudiciarius. Repertorien zur Frühzeit der gelehrten Rechte, Ius Commune, Sonderhefte 19. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984. A description of the earliest Roman and canon law treatises on procedure. An essential book for understanding how learned law influenced the practice of law in the twelfth century. Glosse preaccursiane alle Istituzioni: Strato Azzoniano Libro primo. Ed. Severino Caprioli, Victor Crescenzi et al. Fonti per la Storia d'Italia 107. Rome: Istituto Storico per il Medio Evo, 1984. The first volume of what will be a work of great importance for writing the history of early medieval Roman law. Another recent addition to the sources of Roman law jurisprudence is La Glossa di Poppi alle Istituzioni di Giustiniano. Ed. Victor Crescenzi. Fonti per la storia d'Italia 114. Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1990. Freidrich Carl von Savigny, Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter. 7 Volumes. 2nd Edition. Heidelberg: 1850. Reprinted Bad Homburg: 1961. Savigny is still the most complete guide to the medieval civilians' biographies and their works. Scripta anecdota glossatorum. Biblioteca iuridica medii aevi. 3 Volumes. Bologna: 1888-1914. Reprinted Turin: 1962, is a valuable collection of texts.

Studies: Charles Donahue, Jr. "Law, Civil --- Corpus iuris, Revival and Spread." DMA 7 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1986) 418-425. Robert Feenstra, Droit savant au moyen âge et sa vulgarisation. London: Variorum, 1986. André Gouron, La science du droit dans le Midi de la France au Moyen Age. London: Variorum Reprints, 1984. Ius Romanum Medii Aevi. Milan: Giuffrè, 1961 to present. A x-large scale history of the influence of medieval Roman law on European society. Wilhelm Kalb, Das Juristenlatein: Versuch einer Charakteristik auf Grundlage der Digesten. Nürnberg: 1888, and Wegweiser in die römische Rechtssprache. Leipzig: 1912, both works reprinted Aalen: 1984 is the best discussion of the syntax and grammar of classical Roman law. Hermann U. Kantorowicz, Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938; Reissued with Addenda and Edited by Peter Weimar, Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1969. Paul Koschaker, Europa und das römische Recht. 4th Edition. Munich-Berlin, 1966. Eduard Maurits Meijers, Études d'histoire de droit. Edited by Robert Feenstra and H.F.W.D. Fischer. 4 Volumes. Leiden: 1956-1966. Das römische Recht im Mittelalter. Ed. E.J.H. Schrage. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1987. Paul Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929. Reprinted with a new Foreword by Peter Stein. Cambridge-New York: Speculum historale, 1969 is still one of the most readable surveys of the influence of Roman law in the Middle Ages. Anthology of Medieval Latin

Chapter I.7: Roman and Secular Law:  Latin Texts

By Kenneth Pennington

1. The Burgundian Code

From L.R. De Salis, Leges Burgundionum (MGH, Leges nationum Germanicarum, 1.2.1, Hannover, 1892), pp. 69, 85-87. These two chapters are from the code of laws promulgated between 474-517 by King Gundobad and his son, Sigismund, and they illustrate the general character of these codifications of customary law in which a tariff of penalties is established for each crime. The second chapter is a rare example of a court decision being incorporated into the body of law by royal command. This is a precocious and early example of a judicial judgment obtaining legislative force. Although unusual in the early Middle Ages, by the end of the twelfth century, most legal compilations were composed of court decisions, and jurists routinely fashioned general principles of law from particular cases.

<36>. De incesti adulterio.

Si quis cum parente sua vel uxoris suae sorore in adulterio fuerit deprehensus, pretium*⁽¹⁾ suum⁽²⁾ei, qui est proximus mulieri quam adulteraverat, prout persona⁽³⁾ fuerit, cogatur exsolvere multae nomine solidos XII.; adulteram vero subi iubemus regiae servituti.⁽⁴⁾

<52>. De mulierbus⁽⁵⁾ desponsatis, quae ad aliorum consortium adulterio instigante transierint.

Quotiens huiusmodi causae consurgunt, de quibus nihil praecedentium legum statuta⁽⁶⁾ iusserunt, ita ambiguitatem rei oportet absolvi, ut emissum iudicium⁽⁷⁾ perpetuae legis robur⁽⁸⁾ accipiat, et specialis causa⁽⁹⁾ generalem teneat aequitatem.

Auditis igitur atque perpensis criminalis negotii meritis,⁽¹⁰⁾ quod inter Fredegisclum spatarium*⁽¹¹⁾ nostrum et Baltamodum nec non et Aunegildem vertebatur, sententiam diximus, quae recens facinus resecaret⁽¹²⁾ et futuris temporibus modum districtionis⁽¹³⁾ inponeret.

Et quoniam Aunegilde post mariti prioris obitum in sua potestate consistens se antedicto Fredegisclo non solum ex parentum consensu, verum etiam proprio arbitrio et voluntate donaverat, et maiorem nuptialis pretii partem sponso adnumerante perceperat, fidemque placiti libidinis ardore succensa disrumpens ad Baltamodi non tam vota cucurrit quam ad consuetum flagitium remeavit, atque ob hoc non aliter tantum crimen tantumque dedecus libertatis quam sanguinis sui effusione debuerit expiari, tamen districtoni publicae dierum reverentiam praeponentes iubemus, ut Aunegilde divino humanoque dehonestata iudicio pretium, hoc est CCC solidos,⁽¹⁴⁾ Fredesgisclo coacta dissolvat.

Nec Baltamodum quidem ab ipsius damnationis merito segregamus, qui mulierem alterius coniugio debitam praesumpsit accipere, cuiusque mortem causa poscebat. Sed sententiam nostram ab interitu eius sub hac conditione sanctorum dierum consideratio revocavit ut, nisi cum aliis undecim evidentia praebuerit sacramenta, quibus adfirmet se eo tempore, quo ipsi saepius dicta Aunegilde quasi uxoris iure coniuncta est ignorasse, quod Fredegisclo iam fuerat obligata, pretium suum, hoc est CL. solidos,⁽¹⁵⁾ Fredegisclo non moretur exsolvere. Quod si iuraverit, neque damnum neque periculum patietur.

Iudicium vero in hac causa prolatum ad vicem mansurae in aevum legis praecipimus custodiri. Et ne quemquam deinceps ad exercendum tanti facinoris ausum permissae nunc compositionis⁽¹⁶⁾ temperamenta sollicitent, iubemus, ut quoscumque similis facti reatus aequaverit,⁽¹⁷⁾non tam dispendia sustineant facultatum quam capitis amissione plectantur. Rectius est enim ut paucorum condemnatione multitudo corrigatur, quam sub specie incongruae civilitatis intromittatur occasio, quae licentiam tribuat delinquendi.

Data sub die IIII. kalendas Aprilis Lugduno, Agapito consule.

2. Capitulary of Herstal

From Capitularia regum Francorum, edd. A. Boretius and V. Krause (MGH, Leges, Hannover, 1883) Vol. I, nr. 20. A capitulary was a series of aphoristic commands by a ruler. It was the main form of legislation in the Empire of Charlemagne. The Capitulary of Herstal was promulgated in 779 to reform secular and ecclesiastical adminstration and courts.

Anno feliciter undecimo regni domni nostri Karoli gloriosissimi regis in mense Martio factum capitulare,*⁽¹⁸⁾ qualiter congregatis in unum sinodali concilio*⁽¹⁹⁾ episcopis, abbatibus virisque inlustribus comitibus, una cum piissimo domno nostro secundum Dei voluntatem pro causis oportunis consenserunt⁽²⁰⁾ decretum.

<1>. De metropolitanis,*⁽²¹⁾ ut suffraganii* episcopi eis secundum canones subiecti sint, et ea quae erga minsterium illorum emendanda cognoscunt, libenti animo emendent atque corrigant.

<2>. De episcopis, ubi praesens⁽²²⁾ episcopi ordinati non sunt, sine tarditate ordinentur.

<3>. De monasteriis, qui regulares*⁽²³⁾ fuerunt, ut secundum regulam vivant; necnon et monasteria puellarum ordinem sanctum custodiant, et unaquaeque abbatissa*⁽²⁴⁾ in suo monasterio sine intermissione resedeat.

<4>. Ut episcopi de presbiteris et clericis infra illorum parrochia*⁽²⁵⁾ potestatem habeant secundum canones.

<5>. Ut episcopi de incestuosis hominibus emendandi licentiam habeant, seu et de viduis infra sua parrochia potestatem habeant ad corrigendam.

<6>. Ut nulli liceat alterius clericum recipere aut ordinare in aliquo gradu.

<7>. De decimis, ut unusquisque suam decimam donet, atque per iussionem pontificis*⁽²⁶⁾dispensentur.

<8>. Ut homicidas aut caeteros reos qui legibus mori debent, si ad ecclesiam confugerint, non excusentur, neque eis ibidem victus detur.

<9>. Ut latrones de infra immunitatem⁽²⁷⁾ illi iudicis ad comitum placita*⁽²⁸⁾ praesente<n>tur; et qui hoc non fecerit, beneficium*⁽²⁹⁾ et honorem perdat. Similiter et vassus*⁽³⁰⁾ noster, si hoc non adimpleverit, beneficium et honorem perdat; et qui beneficium non habuerit, bannum*⁽³¹⁾ solvat.

<10>. De eo qui periurium fecerit, nullam redemptionem, nisi manum perdat. Quod si accusator contendere voluerit de ipso periurio, stent ad crucem.⁽³²⁾ Et si iurator vicerit, legem suam accusator emendet.⁽³³⁾ Haec vero de minoribus causis observandum. De maioribus vero rebus aut de statu ingenuitatis secundum legem custodiant.

3. Bulgarus on Procedure

From Quellen zur Geschichte des römisch-kanonischen Processes im Mittelalter, ed. L. Wahrmund (Innsbruck, 1925) Vol. 4, part 1, pp. 3-5. Bulgarus, one of the four great Roman law jurists of the twelfth century, wrote this short procedural tract in the form of a letter to Haimeric, the papal chancellor, around 1140. The twelfth-century jurists wrote many procedural tracts that introduced the rules of procedure in Roman law into twelfth-century courts. In the section below, Bulgarus defined the participants of a trial.

Actor⁽³⁴⁾ est qui persequitur aliquid principaliter dicens rem suam esse vel personam obligatam ad aliquid dandum vel faciendum. Sed et reus⁽³⁵⁾ si intentione adversarii fundata exceptionem opponit, ut condempnationem effugiat, actor intelligitur. Agere enim is videtur, qui exceptione utitur.

Reus est adversus quem contenditur, quia aut possidere vel debere dicatur. Ad probationem actoris pertinet si obtinere velit, ut id quod intendit, probet. Actore enim non probante, qui convenitur,⁽³⁶⁾ etsi nichil praestiterit, obtineat, quia rei favorabiliores sunt quam actores. His aequipollenter dicitur: iure promptiora sunt ad absolvendum quam ad condempnandum. Cumque reus in exceptione actor est, ipsum quod excipit, probare debet . . . Accusare omnibus permissum est, his exceptis. Propter sexum prohibetur mulier, propter aetatem pupillus, propter sacramentum militare qui stipendium meret, idest miles, propter magistratum ut consul et praetor, propter delictum ut infames, propter turpem quaestum, ut hi qui nummos ob accusandum vel non accusandum acceperint, propter conditionem, ut liberti contra patronos, propter suspicionem calumpniae, ut qui falsum testimonium subornati dixerunt. Ratione paupertatis, ut hii, qui minus habent L. aureis . . . Testium ratio est. Ad testimonium cogi possumus per iudicem et improbe versantes absque praescriptione fori coherceri. Aliquando excusamur sive in omnibus causis ut senes valitudinarii sive in aliquibus, veluti in publico crimine. Contra cognatum⁽³⁷⁾ admittimur volentes. Et quandoque excusamur et quandoque cogi possumus inviti. Interdum inviti excusamur et volentes repellimur, ut liberi contra parentes et econverso. Testium quidam iudicis officio, quidam exceptione⁽³⁸⁾ removentur. Iudicis officio propter dicendi suspicionem, exceptione veluti qui dampnati sunt de carmine famoso, quos leges iubent esse inprobos et intestabiles⁽³⁹⁾ . . . Iudicium est actus ad minus trium personarum, actoris intendentis, rei intentionem evitantis, iudicis in medio cognoscentis.

4. A Twelfth-Century Question on Custom

From Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica, Chigi E.vii.218, fol. 72r. A version of the question was printed with many errors in Dissensiones dominorum sive controversiae veterum iuris Romani interpretum qui glossatores vocantur, ed. G. Haenel (Leipzig, 1834, reprinted Aalen, 1964) pp. 151-153. Later edited by Adolfo F. Rosello, Dissensiones dominorum <Cod. Chis. E. VII. 218> §§ 1-50 (Lanciano, 1891), which Ennio Cortese saw in page proofs. The following text is taken from Ennio Cortese, La norma giuridica: Spunti teorici nel diritto comune classico (2 Vols. Ius nostrum 6; Milan: 1962-1964) II 440-441. As jurists acknowledged that rulers could legislate, they posed the question whether custom could abrogate or derogate law. This "quaestio" was undoubtedly used as a classroom exercise, and the opinions of the most important jurists of the time are cited in it.

Circa consuetudinem multiplex consistit opinionum varietas. Nam secundum Placentinum,⁽⁴⁰⁾ nulla consuetudo⁽⁴¹⁾ legi contraria, sive generalis sive specialis, abrogat⁽⁴²⁾ <vel derogat⁽⁴³⁾> legem scriptam, arg. ff. de sepul. viol. Pretor ait § Divus (Dig. 47.12.3.5), et hoc dicunt maxime ea ratione quia, sicut solius principis est legem condere,⁽⁴⁴⁾ ita solius eius est eam abrogare. Sic, ubi vero reperiatur consuetudinem tollere legem, intelligendum dicit legem non scriptam, id est contrariam consuetudinem. Albericus⁽⁴⁵⁾ dicit illam consuetudinem legi contrariam debere servari, que pacto⁽⁴⁶⁾ expresso posset confirmari. Nichil aliud dicit consuetudinem quam pactum tacitum. Dicit ergo in eo casu vincere legem, in quo pactum expressum admittitur <contra> legem, veluti ut fructus pignorum⁽⁴⁷⁾ cedant lucro creditorum. Vbi pactum expressum non observaretur, veluti ut patris, non matris, conditio sequatur, nec consuetudo, ut tacitum pactum, servatur. Johannes Bassianus⁽⁴⁸⁾ distinguit sit⁽⁴⁹⁾ consuetudo iuri⁽⁵⁰⁾ contraria generalis vel specialis, ut, si sit generalis que sub universali totique Romani imperii⁽⁵¹⁾ observatur indistincte, per istam scripta etiam lex abrogatur. Dicit enim talem populum condere legem et abrogare. Si autem consuetudo sit specialis, id est alicuius municipii vel civitatis, subdistingunt si sit communi consensu utentium⁽⁵²⁾ comprobata vel non. Si non est approbata, numquam est observanda. Si autem approbata, quod potest sic apparaere si talis consuetudo aliquando contrario iudicio⁽⁵³⁾confirmata aut res sit perpetuo iudicata, tunc in eo loco omnem legem contrariam vincit, alibi vero non vincit, set vincitur. Nec obstat quod dicitur ff. de sepul. viol. l.iii. § Divus (Dig. 47.12.3.5). Ibi rescripta⁽⁵⁴⁾ principalia post contrariam municipii legem lata fuisse intelliguntur.

5. The Customs of Milan

From Liber consuetudinum mediolani anni MCCXVI, edd. E. Besta and G.L. Barni (Milan, 1949), pp. 53-54, 95-96. The city states of Italy promulgated compilations of their customary laws in the twelfth and thirteenth century. Milan had been a free city since 1056. The oldest statutes date to 1170. In the prologue to the statutes of 1216, we learn that the Podestà, Jacobus de Malacorrigia, together with other citizens of Milan, consented to a compilation of Milanese customs that had been proposed by his predecessor, Brunasius Porcha.⁽⁵⁵⁾ We have excerpted the prologue and title 16 that dealt with the law regulating judicial duels.

Cum olim Brunasius Porcha potestas*⁽⁵⁶⁾ Mediolani de consilio civium in scriptis ordinasset ut universas consuetudines, que in hac civitate de cetero servarentur, rector*⁽⁵⁷⁾ sive potestas sequentis anni in unum redigeret vel redigi faceret ut non alie consuetudines inducerentur, nisi que in illo volumine fuissent invente, placuit omnibus et Iacobo de Malacorrigia potestati sequentis anni . . . <eligere> viros discretos quos sacramento, ut infra ad hoc astrinxit, ut prefatas consuetudines inquirerent et in scriptis redigerent sicut a prenominato B. potestate Mediolani⁽⁵⁸⁾fuerat ordinatum.

Qui volentes ea que iuraverant ad finem congruum perducere, convocatis huiusmodi viris peritis, illis districte preceperunt ut si quas consuetudines haberent, illis ostenderent.

Receptis vero consuetudinibus quibusdam aliis sparsis super quibusdam capitulis, que habuerant, habito quoque et inspecto libello, quem dominus Petrus iudex de consuetudinibus civitatis Mediolani sub certis titulis studiose posuerat, sequentes eundem ordinem tractandi et titulorum quod dictus Petrus scripserat, hanc compilationem sive editionem de diversis consuetudinibus civitatis Mediolani in praenominato libello Petri scriptis et quibusdam aliis ad perpetuam memoriam et singulorum utilitatem in scriptis redigere, et eas praedicto potestati, sicuti astricti fuerant, consignaverunt. De Pugna*⁽⁵⁹⁾

Quia in causis civilibus et criminalibus,⁽⁶⁰⁾ de quibus dictum est superius, saepe pugna per iudices ordinatur, idcirco de pugna et in quibus causis debeat fieri et de modo faciendi et de forma iuramenti breviter videamus.

Pugna ex eo dicta est quod pugno et viribus corporis certant qui congrediuntur. Iudicium autem calentis ferri*⁽⁶¹⁾ seu aquae frigidae*⁽⁶²⁾ non proprie pugna dicitur quia non ex viribus corporis certatur, sed potius divino alias iudicio relinquitur, sicut inferius dicemus.

Fit autem pugna in quolibet furto si summam solidorum sex vel ultra excedat. Haec ita, licet olim aliud, hodie servatur, ut nonnisi suspiciosa persona de furto possit ad pugnam reduci, sicut infra in titulo de furibus et latronibus scriptum invenitur . . .

Sed nec de periurio, iure nostrae consuetudinis, pugna statuitur, et ideo lex Langobardorum*⁽⁶³⁾ scilicet merito in nostra civitate locum non habet. Sed nec inter testes contrarios iure nostro pugna ordinatur, licet iure longobardo fieri debeat. In aliis ergo casibus fit pugna, veluti in furto sicut dictum est. In schacho*⁽⁶⁴⁾ similiter. De incendio quoque et guasto*⁽⁶⁵⁾fit pugna, veluti si blavam⁽⁶⁶⁾ in agris quis guastasse*⁽⁶⁷⁾ vel vites taliasse⁽⁶⁸⁾ vel arbores scorticasse*⁽⁶⁹⁾dicatur et damnum fuerit solidorum sex vel plurium . . . De morte furtiva et de ea quae post pacem vel treugam facta dicitur, pugna legitime ordinatur . . .

Fit autem pugna per campiones.*⁽⁷⁰⁾ Interdum vel per pravas personas quae numquam pugnam sive duellum fecerunt. Et hoc arbitrio illius qui convenitur plerumque relinquitur utrum per se velit pugnare vel per campionem vel aliam personam.

Et si per se pugnare eligerit arbitrio iudicis, inspecta utriusque persona, similis ei ad pugnandum datur. Si vero per campionem pugnare velit, quemcumque voluerit campionem accipiet. Et adversarius eius similiter.

At si per aliam pravam personam quae numquam fecit pugnam contendere voluerit optionem habebit eligendi quem voluerit meliorem. Et altera pars similiter. Alioquin si reus voluerit, adaequatio*⁽⁷¹⁾ personarum fiet per iudicem.

At ubi per consensum partium vel iudicis solertia, de campionibus qui pugnaturi sunt certum fuerit, per iudicem certa pugnandi dies statuitur ut ante consulis*⁽⁷²⁾ presentiam utraque pars veniat parata ad pugnandum. Et si per unam partem steterit quominus die ordinata ad pugnandum venerit, alteri parti occurrenti omnes expensas persolvet . . .

His ita peractis iudex sic dicet, "Ego auctoritate missi regis, qua fungor, iudico pugnam inde fieri." Et postea pugna, lignis vel baculis hinc inde permutatis, guadiatur.*⁽⁷³⁾

Et subsequenter ad sacrmentum actor taliter accedit ut si per se pugnaturus, sic iuret ut eius patronus appelaverat et eo amplius quod scilicet per vim erbarum⁽⁷⁴⁾ vel verborum vel alicuius maleficii non venit ad hanc pugnam; sin autem debet pugnare per alium, campio, ab ipso prius licentia petita, in eius actoris anima iurabit, ut supradictum est, et nomine suo de maleficiis. E contra reus negando simili modo per suum campionem sacramentum subibit.

Quibus omnibus consummatis ad campum pugnandi causa venitur, et iudex ut nihil ex solemnitatibus praetermittat actoris campioni vel ipsi actori, si ipse pugnet, scutum sic annuncians offert, "Accipe scutum impugnationis secundum iustitiam." Fustem quoque tribuit sic dicens, "Accipe fustem impugnationis secundum iustitiam." Reo quoque similiter arma offert dicens, "Accipe scutum vel fustem defensionis secundum iustitiam" . . .

Restat ut de modo pugnandi quid consuetudine nostrae civitatis obtineat breviter videamus. In primis sciendum est quod per campiones semper cum scuto et fuste certatur, nisi de consensu partium aliud fuerit actum. Feltrum*⁽⁷⁵⁾ quoque in dorsum et in ima tibia habere permissum est . . . At si per aliam personam quae numquam pugnam fecit et praecipue quae fuerit de villis duellum statuatur fieri, saepe per scutum et cistam*⁽⁷⁶⁾ pugna ordinatur. Haec tamen omnia quae dicta sunt ex iudicis arbitrio pendent. Pugna vero secundum iudicis officium ordinata est.

Qui ceciderit, idest cuius caput terram tetigerit, subcumbit. Alioquin si genibus terram presserit vel terram manibus tetigerit et corpus ad terram non fuerit prostratum, non subcumbit.

De iudicio vero aquae frigidae illud scire oportet, quod tunc demum ad illud pervenitur cum accusatus propter paupertatem pugnare per campionem non potest, nec persona quae convenitur habilis est ad pugnandum. Et iudicantis est diligenter investigare facultates accusati recusantis pugnam per se vel per alium facere, si eius facultates solidorum C. valeant vel non, et, si minus solidorum C. in bonis habet, ad iudicium praedictum perveniat aquae frigidae. In quo quidem iudicio per partes sic iuratur ut superius dictum est de pugna.

Fit autem iudicium aquae frigidae per puerum virginem ligatum et in aquam per cordam dismissum. Et si illum aqua non receperit, nec submersus fuerit, qui fuerat accusatus subcumbat. Si vero illum aqua sumpserit et submersus fuerit, obtinet.

Illud etiam scire oportet quod ferventis ferri iudicium in nostra civitate non admittitur, licet in quibusdam locis iurisdictionis domini archiepiscopi Mediolani secus obtineat.

6. Emperor Frederick II's Liber Augustalis

From Constitutionum regni siciliarum libri III. (Naples: 1773), pp. 1-7; 67-77 and Die Konstitutionen Friedrichs II. von Hohenstaufen für sein Königreich Sizilien, nach einer lateinischen Handschrift des 13. Jahrhunderts herausgegeben und übersetzt. edd. H. Conrad, T. von der Lieck-Buyken, and W. Wagner (Studien und Quellen zur Welt Friedrichs II., 2. Cologne-Vienna: 1973), pp. 2-4, 40-42. Frederick II promulgated the Liber Augustalis, or as it is also known, the Constitutiones of Melfi, in 1231. He was the first European monarch to promulgate a code of laws that conformed to modern ideas of codification. His collection of laws was intended to supersede the older versions of the laws they contained and to have legal force in their present form from the moment of their promulgation. The following texts are taken from the Proemium of the Liber Augustalis and from one of its harshest provisions, the penalties for clandestine crimes. Subsequent jurists rejected the provisions of this statute. The Proemium is a splendid example of the rhetorical skills of Frederick's chancery.

<Proemium> Post mundi machinam providentia divina firmatam et primordialem materiam naturae melioris officio in rerum effigies distributam, qui facienda providerat, facta considerans et considerata commendans, a globo circuli lunaris inferius hominem, creaturarum dignissimam, ad imaginem propriam effigiemque formatam, quem paulo minus minuerat ab angelis, consilio perpenso disposuit praeponere ceteris creaturis, quem de limo terrae transumptum vivificavit in spiritum ac eidem honoris et gloriae diademate coronato uxorem in sociam, partem sui corporis aggregavit eosque tantae praerogativae munimine decoravit, ut ambos efficeret primitus immortales, ipsosque verumtamen sub quadam lege precepti constituit . . .

Sicque ipsa rerum necessitate cogente nec minus divinae provisionis instinctu, principes gentium sunt procreati, per quos possit licentia scelerum coerceri. Qui vitae necisque arbitri gentibus, qualem quisque fortunam, sortem statumque haberet, velut executores quodammodo divinae sententiae stabilirent, de quorum manibus ut villicationis*⁽⁷⁷⁾ sibi commissae, perfecte reddere valeant rationem. A rege regum et principe principum ita potissime requiruntur, ut sacrosanctam ecclesiam Christianae religionis matrem, detractorum fidei maculari clandestinis perfidiis non permittat, et ut ipsam ab hostium publicorum incursibus gladii materialis potentia tueantur, atque pacem populis eisdemque pacificatis iustitiam, quae velut duae sorores se ad invicem amplexantur pro posse conservent.

Nos itaque quos ad imperii Romani fastigia et aliorum regnorum insignia, sola divinae potentiae dextra praeter spem hominum sublimavit, volentes duplicata talenta nobis credita reddere Deo vivo,⁽⁷⁸⁾ in reverentiam Jesu Christi, a quo cuncta suscepimus quae habemus colendo iustitiam et iura condendo mactare disponimus vitulum labiorum, ei parti nostrorum regiminum primitus providentes, quae in praesenti provisione nostra circa iustitiam magis dignoscitur indigere.

Cum igitur regnum Siciliae nostrae maiestatis hereditas pretiosa, plerumque propter imbecillitatem aetatis nostrae, plerumque etiam propter absentiam nostram praeteritarum turbationum incursibus exstiterit hactenus lacessitum, dignum fore decrevimus ipsius quieti, atque iustitiae summo opere providere, quod ad nostrae serenitatis obsequia resistentibus aliquibus, etiam qui non de ovili regni praefati, nec nostro erant, promptum semper invenimus et devotum.

Praesentes igitur nostri nominis sanctiones⁽⁷⁹⁾ in regno nostro Siciliae tantum volumus obtinere, quas cassatis in regno praedicto legibus et consuetudinibus his nostris constitutionibus adversantibus antiquatis, inviolabiliter ab omnibus in futurum observari praecipimus, in quas praecedentes omnes regum Siciliae sanctiones et nostras iussimus esse transfusas, ut ex his, quae in praesenti nostrarum constitutionum corpore minime continentur, nec robor aliquod nec auctoritas aliqua in iudiciis vel extra iudicia possint assumi.

<28> Si damna clandestina patientibus, quorum actores per probationes⁽⁸⁰⁾ dilucidas inveniri non possint, imperialis provisionis remedio merito subvenimus, ut universaliter per possessores locorum, in quorum territoriis huiusmodi scelera⁽⁸¹⁾ sunt commissa, eorum indemnitatibus consulatur, multo fortius illos expertes⁽⁸²⁾ providentia nostra relinquere credimus indignum, quorum fratres aut filii, cognati⁽⁸³⁾ denique vel affines⁽⁸⁴⁾ in locis aliquibus per homicidia perimuntur occulta, cum tam horribilis sceleris patratores investigatione qualibet, quamvis exactissima, nequeant reperiri.

Praesenti igitur saluberrima constitutione sancimus ut si quando huiusmodi maleficia⁽⁸⁵⁾ in quorumcumque locorum territoriis, quod abominamur, contigerit in posterum*⁽⁸⁶⁾ perpetrari, nec ipsorum commissor appareat, ita quod nullus de tali facinore⁽⁸⁷⁾ ab aliis, qui defuncto attinuerunt, vel a quolibet de populo arguatur,⁽⁸⁸⁾ quo casu divinae constitutionis nostrae super furtivis atque absconsis homicidiis editae statuta servamus,⁽⁸⁹⁾ tunc inquisitionem⁽⁹⁰⁾ de praedicto facinore fieri volumus diligentem, per quam si aliquid certum probabitur, iuxta probata inquisitionis eiusdem procedendum esse censemus.⁽⁹¹⁾

Quod si ex inquisitione ipsa leves⁽⁹²⁾ personae aliquae de homicidio ipso notentur,⁽⁹³⁾ licet per eam contra ipsos non probetur ad plenum,⁽⁹⁴⁾ ad tormenta⁽⁹⁵⁾ ipsarum levium et vilium⁽⁹⁶⁾ personarum postremo decernimus descendendum. Per quae omnia si de delicto⁽⁹⁷⁾ constare non poterit, quod confiteri per nimiam forsan et solitam potentiam tormentorum intrepidi, quibus ingeruntur tormenta, non velint, aut si ob ipsorum impotentiam, prout accidere novimus in plerisque, ultra modum timidi fateantur nec in confessione perdurent soluti tormentis,⁽⁹⁸⁾ quae tamen non timeant iterari, tunc illius loci, in quo maleficium huiusmodi commissum esse dignoscitur, possessores, si quidem Christianus fuerit qui reperitur occisus, centum Augustalium⁽⁹⁹⁾ mulcta feriendos esse censemus. Si vero Iudaeus aut Saracenus sit, in quibus prout certo perpendimus Christianorum persecutio nimis abundat, ad praesens quinquaginta Augustalibus praedictorum locorum incolas nostro aerario⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ applicandis damnandos esse censemus. Quem inquisitionis et probationis ordinem et tormenta etiam ultimo facienda in aliis damnis⁽¹⁰¹⁾ clandestinis et nocturnis servari mandamus.

Quod si constet universitatem⁽¹⁰²⁾ eandem occultare velle forsitan huiusmodi scelerum commissores, nec eos velle officialibus nostris quaerentibus exhibere, poenam universitati ipsi pro qualitate locorum et commissi sceleris imponendam nostro iudicio reservamus.

7. Odofredus on Reason and the Law

From Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto veteri (2 volumes. Lyon 1550-1552; reprint Bologna Forni 1967-68) Vol. 1, fol. 12r to Dig. 1.3.20(19) (Non omnium): Odofredus, a professor of Roman law at the law school in Bologna, wrote his dense and entertaining commentary on the Digest in the middle of the thirteenth century. In the following passages he explains that reason cannot always be found in positive law. Separating reason and morality from the content of law was one of the great achievements of medieval jurists.

In lege ista iurisconsultus⁽¹⁰³⁾ reprehendit illos qui de singulis petunt rationem sibi reddi dicens non omnium que a maioribus statuta sunt ratio reddi potest. De his enim que posita sunt iure positivo*⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ et propria voluntate non est querenda vel reddenda alia ratio, nisi quia auctori ita placuit, ne si de singulis quereremus rationem, multa que certa sunt iure nostro subverterentur, hoc dicit ista lex cum lege sequente . . . Sed que est ratio quare pretor dixit de xviii. et non dixit de xix.? Certe de hoc non est querenda ratio nec reddenda, nisi quia ita placuit pretori. Item potest notare exemplum de positivis; si queratur que eat ratio cur in usuris⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ rerum mobilium⁽¹⁰⁶⁾statutum est triennium et non biennium vel quadriennium? Item cur in prescriptione⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ rerum immobilium⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ statutum est decennium et non xii.? Certe de hoc non potest reddi ratio, nec est querenda nisi quia ita placuit auctori iuris, unde sit pro ratione voluntas.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Vnde cum eram scholaris habui quemdam socium qui erat magnus philosophus in artibus*⁽¹¹⁰⁾ et de singulis volebat querere rationem. Nam querebat ipse a me quare plures leges sunt in uno titulo quam in alio. De istis non est querenda nec reddenda ratio, nisi sicut reddebam ei: "Quia materia in qua sunt x. leges est generalior quia potest dividi in decem articulos, sed materia in qua sunt posite viii. leges est strictior, quia non potest dividi nisi in octo legibus.

8. Bracton on the Laws of England

From Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England, ed. S.E. Thorne and G.E. Woodbine (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), Vol. 2, pp. 19-24, 305. For centuries historians attributed a thirteenth-century commentary on English law to Henry Bracton. The most recent editor of the work has called his authorship into question, but no matter who wrote it, the tract is the most sophisticated comprehensive treatment of English law from the medieval period.

Quae sunt regi necessaria. In rege qui recte regit necessaria sunt duo haec, arma videlicet et leges, quibus utrumque tempus bellorum et pacis recte possit gubernari. Utrumque enim istorum alterius indiget auxilio, quo tam res militaris possit in tuto, quam ipsae leges armorum podio sint servatae.

. . . Quid sit lex et quid consuetudo. Videndum est etiam quid sit lex. Et sciendum quod lex est commune praeceptum virorum consultum prudentium, delictorum⁽¹¹¹⁾ quae sponte vel ignorantia contrahuntur coertio, rei publicae⁽¹¹²⁾ sponsio communis. Item auctor iustitiae est Deus, secundum quod iustitia est in creatore. Et secundum hoc ius et lex idem significant. Et licet largissime dicatur lex omne quod legitur, tamen specialiter significat sanctionem iustam, iubentem honesta, prohibentem contraria. Consuetudo vero quandoque pro lege observatur in partibus ubi fuerit more utentium approbata, et vicem legis obtinet. Longaevi enim usus et consuetudinis non est vilis auctoritas.

. . . Quid sit ius. De hoc autem quod dicit ius suum, idest iustitiae, et sic dicitur ius iustitia quia in ea stant omnia iura. Ius ergo derivatur a iustitia, et habet varias significationes. Ponitur enim quandoque pro ipsa arte vel pro eo quod scriptum habemus de iure, quod ius dicitur ars boni et aequi, cuius merito quis nos sacerdotes appellat. Iustitiam namque colimus et sacra iura ministramus.

. . . Ad quid creatus sit rex . . . Exercere igitur debet rex potestatem iuris sicut Dei vicarius et minister in terra, quia illa potestas solius Dei est, potestas autem iniuriae diaboli et non Dei, et cuius horum opera fecerit rex eius minister erit cuius opera fecerit. Igitur dum facit iustitiam vicarius et regis aeterni, minister autem diaboli dum declinet ad iniuriam. Dicitur enim rex a bene regendo et non a regnando, quia rex est dum bene regit, tyrannus dum populum sibi creditum violenta opprimit dominatione. Temperet igitur potentiam suam per legem quae frenum est potentiae, quod secundum leges vivat, quod hoc sanxit lex humana quod leges suum ligent latorem, et alibi in eadem, digna vox maiestate⁽¹¹³⁾ regnantis est legibus, scilicet alligatum se principem profiteri. Item nihil tam proprium est imperii quam legibus vivere, et maius imperio est legibus submittere principatum,⁽¹¹⁴⁾ et merito debet retribuere legi quod lex tribuit ei, facit enim lex quod ipse sit rex.

9. Guido of Suzzara on the Authority of the Prince

Although not well known, Guido of Suzzara was an important jurist of the late thirteenth century. He taught at Reggio Emilia, Padua, Bologna, and served in the curia of Charles of Anjou, king of the Kingdom of Sicily. He views on monarchy were unusually inventive. The following passages are taken from his Suppletiones to the Code and the Digest. "Suppletiones" were additional comments on a legal text that were meant to supplement the gloss.

A. From Guido of Suzzara, Suppletiones to Cod. 1.14(17).4 (Digna vox), Paris, B.N. lat. 4489, fol. 33v:

Infra eodem, Digna, "alligatum": Nota quod si imperator facit pacem cum aliqua ciuitate seu cum aliquo comite uel barone,*⁽¹¹⁵⁾ et ineat aliqua pacta, teneretur ea obseruare, nec potest uenire contra uel ea infringere, ut hic et qui testa. fac. pos. l. Si quis (Cod. 6.22.6) et de testa. l. Ex imperfecto (Cod. 6.23.3)⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Item nec pacta facta per suos antecessores potest infringere, ut infra de testa. milit. l. Que a patre (Cod. 2.51.7) et de rebus alien. uel non alien. l. Venditrici (Cod. 4.51.3)

Nec obstat quod dicitur quod par in parem non habet imperium,⁽¹¹⁷⁾ ut ff. de iniur. Nec magistratibus (Dig. 47.10.32) et ad Trebell. Ille a quo § Tempestiuum (Dig. 36.1.13.4) quod imperator dum uiuit parem non habet, et successor suus heres habet seruare facta predecessorum ut dictum est. Guido.

B. Suppletiones to Dig. 1.3.31(30) (Princeps legibus), Paris, B.N. lat. 4489, fol. 4r, Paris, B.N. lat. 4488, fol. 321r:

Quod si princeps pactum faciat cum aliquo, teneturne seruare uel potest conueniri ex contractu quam iniuit cum aliquo? Et uidetur quod non teneatur seruare, nec possit conueniri, arg. huius <legis>, uel quia hic dicitur ipsum esse legibus solutum.⁽¹¹⁸⁾ Item alibi dicitur ipsum esse dominum mundi, infra ad leg. Ro. de iac. l. Deprecatio (Dig. 14.2.8) Item sicut pactum inter dominum et seruum non ualet, ut C. de transact. l. Interpositas (Cod. 2.4.13) Sic uidetur in ista questione. Econtra uidetur quod princeps debeat seruare contractus quod fecit cum aliquo quia contractus iuris gentium⁽¹¹⁹⁾ sunt, ut supra de iust. et iur. l. Ex his (Dig. 1.1.5), cui iuri non potuit derogare princeps, cum sit ius immutabile, ut inst. de iure natural. § Set naturalia (Inst. 1.2.11) Item ex imperfecto testamento princeps legatum⁽¹²⁰⁾ uel fideicommissum⁽¹²¹⁾ non frangit, ut infra de legat. et fideicom. Ex imperfecto (Dig. 32.1.23)⁽¹²²⁾ Item "cum ipse princeps et augusta⁽¹²³⁾ heredes instituuntur, ius commune cum ceteris habent," ut C. qui tes. facere pos. l. Cum heredes (Cod. 6.22.7) Item ipse pacta et contractus precepit aliis seruare, ergo quod ei uidetur iustum, imperat aliorum, seruare debet in sua, ut infra de cond. indeb. Frater a fratre (Dig. 12.6.38) et infra de pact. Cum in eo (Dig. 2.14.44(45)) Item "non debent nasci iniurie unde <iura prodierunt>," etc. ut C. unde ui l. Meminerint (Cod. 8.4.6) et hoc est uerum in questione ista, quia cum ipse se sponte subiaciat legibus ut probatum est in lege uero allegata, quod a principio seruat uoluntarium, scilicet se subicere legibus, postquam se subiecit necessitatis est. Sicut dicimus in compromisso suscipiendo quod ab initio est uoluntarium, postea necessitatis, ut quod arg. infra de arbit. l.iii. § Tamen etsi neminem (Dig. 4.8.3.1) sicut in commodato, ut infra commod. i. In commodato § Sicut (Dig. 13.6.17) et similibus obligationibus, ut C. de act. et oblig. l. Sicut (Cod. 4.10.5) Qui autem erit iudex in causa ista? Respon. Procurator Cesaris, ut C. ubi cause fis. agan. l. Ad fiscum (Cod. 3.26.5) et C. si aduersus fis. l.ii. (Cod. 2.36(37).2).

10. Testimony of Witnesses in a Bolognese Court

From Albertus Gandinus und das Strafrecht der Scholastik, ed. H. U. Kantorowicz (Berlin, 1907), pp. 291-292. In the thirteenth century the testimony of witnesses was regularly recorded in writing. The following document was written in January, 1289 and records the testimony of witnesses in an investigation of a certain Petrus Jacobi who was arrested on the streets of Bologna by the "barvarii" of the Potestà. Each witness was asked to respond to three statements (capitula) that have not survived. We cannot know why Petrus was apprehended, but the answers of the witnesses provide intriguing hints. The unadorned and vernacular Latin is typical of these documents. Note the Italian spellings, wording, and awkward syntax.

Die lune X. ianuarii.

Petrus Iacobi, capelle s. Iosepi,⁽¹²⁴⁾ cavit⁽¹²⁵⁾ obligando se et omnia sua bona pignori etcetera, de non producendo falsos testes ocaxione,⁽¹²⁶⁾ quod probare vult super inventione facta per militem et barvarios⁽¹²⁷⁾ potestatis,⁽¹²⁸⁾ et de libris CCC. bononie. Fideiussit pro eo Lambertinus Gualangi dicte capelle, approbatus per Cambium Petri, approbatorem comunis.⁽¹²⁹⁾

Lazarinus Amici, capelle predicte, Faciolus Bonvezini, capelle s. Felicis, testes producti per predictum Petrum, caverunt de libris CCC. pro quolibet eorum. Fideiussit pro eo dictus Lambertinus, approbatus per Cambium Petri approbatorem comunis.

Testes producti per Petrum Iacobi ad sui deffesnionem, quia inventus fuit per familiam domini potestatis de sero post tertium sonum campane.

Lazarinus filius Amigi, capelle s. Iosepi, testis iuratus precepto domini potestatis et de veritate dicenda, interrogatus super primo capitulo, dixit hic testis, "bene verum est quod Petrus fuit inventus sub porticu suo tunc, quando familia potestatis invenerit eum." Interrogatus quomodo scit predicta, respondit, "quia eram secum sub ipso porticu et sentivi familiam domini potestatis et incontinenti reversus fui in domo." Interrogatus quando fuit predictum respondit, "non recordor." Interrogatus super secundo capitulo, dixit hic testis, "bene bonus homo et bone fame est dictus Petrus."

Faciollus Bonvezini testis iuratus ut supra et prelecto sibi capitulo primo dixit hic testis, "bene erat dictus Petrus sub porticu suo." Interrogatus super secundo, dixit hic testis, "bene exiverat dictus Petrus extra domum suam caussa urinandi." Interrogatus si ipse habitat in domo una cum dicto Petro, nec si ipse audivit dicere dictus Petrus, "ego vollo ire extra domum caussa urinandi," respondit, "non audivi dicere." Interrogatus qua de caussa dixit quod ipse bene venerit extra domum caussa urinandi, respondit "quia vidi ipsum urinare et non aliter scio."

Endnotes

1. 1. Wergeld or money value that was placed on the life of each person.

2. 2. Some translators have rendered "suum" as "her," rather than "his." This passage illustrates the difficulty of understanding early medieval legal texts.

3. Persona = Legal status of the person.

4. Servitus = Servitude or slavery.

5. Mulier = Woman.

6. Statuta legum = a redundancy. Although these are Roman legal terms, no Roman jurist would have written "statutes of laws."

7. Iudicium = Has two technical meanings. Can mean the entire procedural process (the trial) or the judgment of the judge.

8. Robur = Authority; cf. Justinian's Institutes, prologue: "nostrarum constitutionum robur."

9. Causa = Can mean the reason for a judicial action or the trial itself.

10. Meritum = The essential issues of a case.

11. Spatarium = Sword-bearer.

12. Resecare = To stop or, perhaps, to punish.

13. Districtio = Restraint, punishment, power, jurisdiction, authority.

14. Three hunderd solidi was the wergeld of a noble man.

15. One hundred and fifty solidi was the price of a royal agent or a freeman of the lower classes (minores personae). Noble Aunegild had fallen in lover with a commoner.

16. Compositio = Settlement, payment.

17. Aequare = To equal, i.e. to commit.

18. Capitulare = To promulgate a capitulary.

19. Sinodale concilium = In later Latin, this would refer to an ecclesiastical assembly. In the time of Charlemagne it could be a lay assembly that the clergy also attended.

20. Subject of "consenserunt" is the assembled people.

21. Metropolitanus = An archbishop who had suffragan bishops under his jurisdiction.

22. Presens = Used as adverb.

23. 23. Clergy who lived according to a rule (e.g. Benedictine Rule).

24. 24. Abbatissa = Abbess.

25. 25. Parrochia = paroecia or parochia in late classical Latin.

26. 26. pontifex = episcopus. In the early Middle Ages this title was not restricted to the pope.

27. Immunitas = Privileged areas, i.e. jurisdiction.

28. 28. Placitum = Another legal term with more than one meaning. It can mean an assembly or court or a plea or case.

29. 29. beneficium = office (later fief).

30. 30. Vassus = vassal.

31. 31. bannum = penalty.

32. 32. A type of early medieval ordeal in which the two parties stood before a crucifix with their arms outstretched. The loser was the first to drop his arms.

33. Emendare legem = To compensate <the accused> according to the provisions of the law.

34. 34. Actor = Plaintiff.

35. 35. Reus = Defendant. It can also mean the guilty party.

36. Convenire = Summon to court.

37. 37. Blood relation.

38. 38. Exceptio = A defense presented by the defendant to deny a plaintiff's claim.

39. If persons is notorious, prejudiced, or infamous, they may be prevented from testifying or judging in court. They may be removed by the judge or by an exception put forward by the parties (in this case not a counterclaim but an objection grounded in rules of procedure).

40. 40. Jurist who studied with Bulgarus and taught at Montpellier. Died in 1192.

41. 41. Consuetudo = Custom or Usage. Custom could be written or unwritten law.

42. 42. Abrogare = To annul a law completely.

43. 43. Derogare = To annul a provision or a part of a law. It often means to grant an exception to a particular law.

44. 44. Condere = To establish or create law.

45. Late twlefth-century jurist, about whom little is known.

46. 46. Plactum = An agreement of two or more persons.

47. Pignus = A thing given in pledge to a creditor by a debtor. In the case of property, the thing pledged might produce a "fructus" which might be sold.

48. Important jurist of late twelfth century, who taught at Bologna.

49. Juristic Latin often omits interrogatives and conjunctions.

50. 50. Ius = Has three meanings: a law, a right, and the entire legal system. "De iure" means lawfully.

51. 51. Imperium = Power, authority, jurisdictional authority; the empire.

52. 52. Communis consensus utentium = A technical expression used by the jurists to describe the people's consent to customary law.

53. Contrarium iudicium = a contrary legal judgment.

54. Rescriptum = Written answers given by the emperor to legal questions.

55. 55. The podestà was the chief magistrate of the Italian city state and served in his office for one year.

56. 56. Potestas = Podestà, chief magistrate.

57. 57. Rector = Chief officer of a corporation in medieval law; chief magistrate.

58. 58. Mediolanum = Milan.

59. 59. Pugna = judicial duel.

60. 60. Like modern law, court cases were divided into two broad categories, civil and criminal cases.

61. 61. Iudicium calentis ferri = Ordeal of the hot iron.

62. 62. Iudicium aquae frigidae = Ordeal of cold water.

63. 63. Lex Langobardorum = Lombard law.

64. 64. Schachum = robbery.

65. 65. Guastum (Vastum) = Devastation, deforestation.

66. Blava = Blada.

67. 67. Guastare (Vastare) = To wound or waste.

68. Taliare = To cut.

69. 69. Scorticare = to damage.

70. 70. campio = champion.

71. 71. Adaequatio = Aequatio.

72. 72. Consulis = Magistrate of Italian city states.

73. 73. Guadiare (vadiare, wadiare) = to give a pledge.

74. 74. Herbarum.

75. 75. Feltrum (Filtrum) = felt.

76. 76. Cista = Means box; but what is probably meant is a type a satchel that is filled with stones or some other objects.

77. 77. Villicatio = Office, administration.

78. 78. Cf. Matt. 25:22.

79. Sanctio = Statute.

80. 80. Probatio = Proof, evidence.

81. 81. Scelus = Criminal act.

82. Expers = Unknown.

83. 83. Cognatus = Blood relationship.

84. 84. Affinis = Related by marriage.

85. 85. Maleficium = Crime, wrongdoing.

86. 86. In posterum = In the future.

87. 87. Facinus = Criminal offense.

88. 88. Arguere = To accuse, or less often, to convict.

89. 89. Liber Augustalis, Book I, title 27.

90. 90. Inquisitio = Investigation or inquiry according to the rules of judicial procedure.

91. 91. The statute envisioned two steps, first an inquiry, then the trial.

92. 92. Levis = Base, infamous.

93. 93. Notare = To blame.

94. 94. <Probatio> plena = Full and complete proof.

95. 95. Tormentum = Torture.

96. 96. Levis et vilis = base and contemptible. This is a precise legal description that later jurists would call "infames."

97. 97. Delictum = Wrong, tort.

98. 98. A defendant had to repeat a confession extracted by torture in court when not under duress, or the confession was not valid.

99. 99. Augustalis = Gold coin.

100. 100. Aerarium = Royal fisc or treasury.

101. 101. Damnum = Loss or damage.

102. 102. Universitas = Corporation, idest city-state or principality.

103. 103. Iurisconsultus = Legal scholar.

104. 104. Ius positivum = Positive law. The jurists invented this term at the end of the twelfth century to define human law, promulgated by a ruler (princeps), which they distinguished from divine, natural law, and custom.

105. 105. Usurae = Interest paid by a debtor; the fruit of capital.

106. 106. Res mobiles = Moveable property.

107. 107. Praescriptio = To claim a right or title to something through use or possession for a certain time.

108. 108. Res immobiles = Immoveable property.

109. 109. A famous tag borrowed from Juvenal (Satires 6.223) that the jurists used to describe the authority of the prince.

110. 110. Artes = The liberal arts that consisted of the trivium and quadrivium.

111. 111. Delictum = A wrong prosecuted through a private action and punished by a fine. In English law, a tort.

112. 112. Res publica = Has many different meanings: The state, the people, the fisc of the prince, the rights of the people.

113. 113. Maiestas = Sovereignty of the prince.

114. 114. Principatum = The rule or government of the prince.

115. 115. Baro = A great man of the realm; baron.

116. 116. Guido is referring to a law in the Code that reads: "Licet enim lex imperii sollemnibus iuris imperatorem solverit, nihil tam proprium imperii est, ut legibus vivere."

117. 117. Par in parem imperium non habet = A famous juristic maxim that was used to define a prince's sovereignty over his predecessors and successors.

118. 118. Legibus solutus = The prince is not bound by the laws. This maxim did not usually carry the implication that the prince could exercise arbitrary power.

119. 119. Ius gentium = Law of nations, natural law.

120. 120. Legatum = Legacy stipulated in a will (testamentum) to a person other than the heir.

121. 121. Fideicommissum = A testator's request to his heir that a certain benefit be given to a third person. The fideicommissum and the legatum were considered equal in later Roman law.

122. 122. The text of the Digest reads: "Decet enim tantae maiestati eas seruare leges, quibus ipse solutus esse uidetur."

123. Augusta = Empress.

124. 124. Capella S. Iosepi = Quarter of the city.

125. Caveo = To testify with proper legal forms.

126. 126. ocaxione = occasione. Italian spelling.

127. Barvarius = Retainer.

128. 128. Potestas = Podestà. Chief magistrate in thirteenth-century Italian city states.

129. 129. comunis = commune (term used to refer to the city state).