This is an augmented and revised essay that appeared in Recto
ordine procedit magister. Liber amicorum E.C. Coppens, edited by Jan Hallebeek et al. (Iuris Scripta Historica 28; Brussels: Royal Flemish Academy of
Arts and Sciences, 1212).
Women on the Rack:
Torture and Gender in the
Ius
commune
Kenneth Pennington
The Middle Ages is a Distant Mirror.[1]
It is a mirror
in which we see ourselves only dimly or rarely.
Serious scholars have warned us that what we see can be misleading. These warnings have merit.
In 2008 Gabrielle
Spiegel was president of the American Historical Association and came to that
office as a distinguished medievalist.
In the Association’s
Perspectives
on History she pointed out that the authors of the torture memos produced
by the Department of Justice used medieval analogies to support their
arguments. Borrowing dialogue from
Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction she called their efforts “getting medieval.”
In Tarantino’s script “getting medieval” meant
getting downright nasty.
Spiegel argued
that the neo-cons who used medieval examples and medievalists who use analogies
to confront modern problems “without demonstrating the validity of the
transference” are guilty of betraying their sources.[2] So, the reader of this essay has been
properly warned.
Nonetheless, I think that
looking into the mirror is worth the effort.
We should not reject the images we see as just being untrustworthy
phantoms from a strange and alien place.
The story that I will tell in this essay is of four women. Queen Sibílla Fortià of Aragon,
an unknown woman named Mita, Beatrice Cenci of Rome, and
Artemisia Gentileschi, also of Rome. What unites these four women is
torture. All four were summoned to
court, and all four were tortured.
There is nothing particularly unusual about being tortured in a medieval or early modern courtroom. It is very much part of the Distant Mirror --- and not alien to the present. Human beings have tortured other human beings for several millennia. Ancient Roman jurists gave torture a place in their legal system and created a jurisprudence that described and circumscribed torture. Medieval courts included torture in their arsenal of procedural steps through which information was gathered and the “truth” was established. However, Roman, medieval, and early modern jurists believed that torture was a flawed instrument. It had to be used carefully. It did not always deliver the truth. Eventually torture was abolished in the eighteenth century for two reasons: Torture did not work, and it was barbaric. In spite of that historical record and the Enlightenment’s rejection of torture, we have reintroduced torture in the early twenty-first century as being acceptable, even admirable, in fact and fiction. The American Central Intelligence Agency and a television character, Jack Bauer, bravely used torture and justified its use by fear: fear of the dangerously unknowable. The torturers were praised, supported and applauded by many in government, academia, and the American public.[3] The same fear permeates the stories of two of these women. They were tortured because their crimes were considered to be dangerous threats to society and public order. The third was tortured for an entirely different reason: she wanted to be believed. Like the CIA agents and their enablers among us she was convinced that torture could produce reliable evidence that would sway the judges who tortured her.
In the pre-modern world torture produced a “gender
gap.” Men were tortured, but women were
generally spared or exempted from its worst forms. Some crimes, however, were considered so
heinous that women were not spared the rack.[4] Treason, heresy and magic were particularly
loathed. In the minds of princes, jurists, and common folk they were equally
monstrous. Although women were far from
equal in pre-modern law, they were considered capable of serious crimes. Women were especially dangerous because of
the powers of their sexuality and their talent for the occult. Women who were accused of crimes of magic,
witchcraft, or sexual adventurousness could easily become victims of society’s
fear. Sibílla, Mita, Beatrice, and Artemisia were in court because of four different crimes: magic,
adultery, murder and rape. How these four women were treated will not
give us startling new insights into the status of women in medieval and early
modern society, but these four stories will resonate with the reasons that the
American government gave when it resorted to torture at the beginning of the
twentieth century.
It may be a distant mirror,
but it is a mirror.
The most important and prolific jurist of the
fourteenth century, Baldus de Ubaldis
(† 1400), discussed Sibílla’s late fourteenth-century
cause célèbre in one of his many consilia.[5] By chance his consilium
contains the only trustworthy information we have about the trial. The Queen of Aragon, Sibílla Fortià, had been married to King Pedro IV (1336-1387)
and was the stepmother of Pedro’s son, King Juan I (1387-1395). Juan
entertained doubts about Sibílla, and soon after he
ascended the throne he accused her of practicing black magic that he said
affected his health.[6] The case must have attracted
attention far outside Aragon because Baldus was
commissioned to write a consilium that discussed the
legality of Sibílla’s treatment by the court. Consilia were the
dominant genre in the late medieval Ius
commune, and they can be roughly compared to briefs in modern American
common law.
Like briefs most consilia were “ex parte,” that is the jurist did not do an
even handed analysis of a case but presented an argument for one of the
parties.[7] Writing consilia
was a major source of income for jurists in the late; Baldus wrote more consilia than any other medieval jurist. He was reported to have earned 15,000 ducats,
a magnificent sum, for selling his learned opinions.[8]
In some cases
marginal notations in his manuscript tell us who commissioned the consilium and how much was paid, but this Sibílla’s consilium contains no
marginal note.
The case was perfect for the international gossip
trade. There are, as far as we know, no records of the trial in the Spanish
archives, and, although we have no idea from where he got his information, Baldus seems to have been very well informed about it.
Sibílla’s stepson,
King Juan, was reputed to be effete and profligate; Sibílla
was endowed, it was thought, with magical powers. King Juan accused her not
only of sorcery but, since she wished to injure the king, also of treason.
The first question that Baldus
raised was whether a queen could be tortured. He rehearsed the legal norms that
were embedded in the jurisprudence of the Ius
commune. No one could be tortured
without firm evidence (indicia certa) whose
authenticity cannot be doubted.[9] Remarkably, he quoted a Moslem and Christian
to buttress his argument.
He cited the
Moslem philosopher Averroës: “to seek reason when we
have knowledge is an infirmity of intelligence;” if there were full proofs of
guilt, torture was unnecessary.[10] Baldus thought that Sibílla had confessed because of torture or from “probable
and necessary fear” of torture. As soon as she was free from torture and fear,
she recanted her confession. He noted that the confession obtained through
torture was not valid unless it had been repeated in court when the defendant
was not buffeted by the terror of torture.[11] Baldus then
turned to a Christian theologian: “As Albertus Magnus
said, a free person must have a free mind and a free tongue”[12]. What constitutes just
fear? Baldus asked. “A just fear is to be afraid of
the cruelty or the criminal (capitalis) hostility of
a powerful person .
. .
Fear
and extortion arise from a just reason for fearing.”[13] Baldus’ solution to whether Sibílla
should have been tortured reflects his well-known fear of offending princes —
especially his own.[14] “The matter should be left
to the conscience of the king who should take counsel with the saints and
learned men who fear God. If he does otherwise he sins enormously.”[15] In the second half of his consilium Baldus did make the
point that even nobles could be tortured if they practiced magic.[16] If the prosecutors of Sibílla
followed the rules of the late thirteenth-century Castillian
codification, Las siete partidas covering the law of torture, they would
have adhered to the norms (with a few exceptions) of the
Ius commune.[17]
We do not know what happened to Sibílla. We do know that a trial took place. We know that contrary to the normal rules
governing the use of torture that she was tortured during the trial. That is not a surprise. King Juan accused her of a crime that gripped
the imaginations of European males for centuries: the power of a woman to
exercise the powers of the occult. The fear of a woman’s power to injure their
victims did not subside until the end of the seventeenth century in Europe.[18]
Baldus had no doubts about how dangerous a woman with
magical powers was.
Their social
standing did not protect them.
Rather it
aggravated their offense.[19]
At the end of
the consilium Baldus asked
the question whether magic can work through a spell cast upon the victim and
whether a spell could disturb a person’s mind.
The question must have arisen from what Baldus
knew about Sibílla’s trial. Could Sibílla, in
other words, have injured King Juan with
a spell? Baldus’
answer was yes, if God permitted it.[20]
He also asked
whether one spell could negate another.
Again,
Baldus thought a spell could be countered by another
spell, even a spell of demons could be effective in removing a spell. Sometimes, he observed, we must drink from
turbid water.[21]
Baldus’s answers were on the edge of what was theologically
orthodox in the late fourteenth century and are revealing for what they tell us
about the educated, elite ideas about magic and its dangers. His ideas may have endorsed beliefs that were
firmly embedded in the uneducated and the elite. Baldus was not a
skeptic. He believed that Sibílla might have seriously injured her stepson with
magic. He was not convinced about the
necessity of torture in a trial, but he did have a healthy fear of magic.
Baldus
discussed the torture of women in another consilium
that dealt with a wife, Mita, who had been accused by her husband, Mutius, of adultery.
He presented the court with the testimony of four witnesses, three of
whom presented problems.
The three
comprised a priest, to whom Mita had presumably confessed
her sin outside the confessional and to her husband’s father and brother. Baldus grappled with
a legal question that emerged in the twelfth century. Do confessions made outside the courtroom
have any validity or weight?[22] Baldus did not explain directly how Mita
managed to blunder into that thicket of jurisprudential and personal briarpatch.
There
was a story hiding behind his sparse facts that Boccaccio might have told well.[23] A witness had seen Mita
on the streets at night in a place that was suspect. He or she told her husband. Her husband, his father and his brother had
questioned her (in the presence of the priest?). She had evidently confessed to adultery. Once away from her kin (and their menance?) she retracted her confession. The central question of the consilium was whether the evidence (indicia) were
sufficient to submit her to torture?[24]
The judge in
the case had already ruled that she could be tortured. Baldus was asked
whether his decision was correct.
Like a good but unscrupulous lawyer Baldus did not confront the issue but attacked the victim. His first point was that Mita’s
confession was made to honest persons but avoided the issue of consanguinity. Under normal circumstances witnesses who were
related to the plaintiff and were not permitted to testify in the Ius commune. Baldus, however, avoided that legal objection and alleged
that Mita was “suspectissima”
because an unnamed witness (probably the first one he mentioned) placed her
outside her home at night and at a suspicious time.
[25] Mita responded that
she was visiting a female friend who would offer a reason for her visit. Baldus rejected her
excuse. The only reason for being out at night was to
do evil; those who do wrong hate the light.
[26] He argued on the basis of a very dubious
precedent in canon law and an even more dubious principle from Roman law that
one witness could provide a proof and that persons from a household (domestici) could provide evidence in a criminal case. The canon law precedent was flawed because it
was a precedent in testamentary law establishing the validity of a will and was
not criminal accusation.
The Roman law
allegation did not establish that household persons could testify in criminal
matters, especially sexual crimes.[27]
Baldus
finally confronted the central legal question: could a confession made to a
priest and her husband’s father and brother outside the courtroom be sufficient
to condemn Mita to torture. To his discredit and with not a single
justification in the jurisprudence of the Ius commune, but with a specious
argument about family honor, Baldus said yes. The accusation of adultery stains the entire
family; further it is within the judge’s discretion to decide whether the
evidence is sufficient to torture the defendant.[28]
What led Baldus to write
such a flawed defense of the judge’s decision to torture Mita
on the basis of clearly insufficient evidence?
The short answer is money.
A
longer answer that in some way may exonerate him would be the nature of conslia and the role it played in the jurisprudence of the
Ius commune. The judge’s decision may
have provoked outrage because it was contrary to prior jurisprudence on the
validity of confessions made outside the courtroom. If so, the court may have sollicited Baldus for his Consilium sapientis.
Baldus was paid to write an ex parte defense of the court’s
decision. The judge may have wished to
have the most famous jurist of the times write an exculpatory opinion, because he
feared that Mita’s family might bring suit against him
though a procedure known as sindicatio. The procedure was used to bring magistrates
to justice who misused their offices.[29]
Another reason
for the court’s solicitation of
Baldus’ consilium is that Mita’s family may have appealed the judge’s decision to
torture her.[30] Of course both possibilities are
speculation. What we can say 600 years
later is that Baldus wrote a very poor opinion if one
were to judge it according to the procedural norms of his time.
At the end of his consilium made two contradictory
observations: first Mita’s
journeys into the night betrayed her guilt.
Her scurrying through the dark shadows of the city resembled the
skulking of wolves and foxes.
Her
behavior demanded torture.[31] However, he warned the judge that he should
exercise care when he tortured Mita. If she did not confess during torture she should
be completely exonerated.[32] His conclusion seems to contradict his opinion
in his discussion of Queen Sibílla, and the common opinion
of the jurists. They generally believed that
the evidence for torture should fall just short of absolute proof of guilt.
Baldus’ conclusion belies
his certain declarations of her guilt. My
conclusion would be that Baldus was much more interested
in protecting the judge than upholding Mita’s rights.
In contrast to the cases of Queen Sibílla
and Mita, we have reams of documentation about one of
the most famous murder trials of the entire period, the prosecution of Beatrice
Cenci for the murder of her father, Francesco Cenci.[33]
Beatrice, her lover Olimpio Calvetti,
her brothers Giacomo and Bernardo, and a local peasant Marzio
Catalano were all involved in the plot. The facts were simple but scandalous. Francesco
Cenci was a tyrant.
He had a well-earned
reputation for violence and sexual crimes against women and young boys. He imprisoned Beatrice and her stepmother Lucrezia against their wills in the Cenci fortress Rocca della Petrilla
a few miles from Rieti.
Beatrice hatched a plot to kill her father. On
September 9, 1598 Olimpio, Marzio
and Beatrice went into Francesco’s room, beat him, and threw him out the
window. They concocted a crude story that he fell from his window, but the
blood on Francesco’s sheets and bed convinced authorities otherwise. They were
brought to trial in February 1599. Olimpio, who had fled, was murdered and escaped the
courtroom.
The trial conformed to the norms of the
Ius commune. The Cenci were one of
Rome’s most ancient and noble families. Therefore, they could not be tortured.
There were no witnesses to the crime, and the evidence against them was
circumstantial. Further, Francesco had a brutal reputation and many enemies. Nonetheless,
the evidence might have been enough to convict them if they had not been
members of Rome’s highest nobility.
However, only the prince’s command to permit torture could provide the incontrovertible
proof that the court needed politically and jurisprudentially to condemn
them. Still, the evidence, although
circumstantial, was quite strong. Angelus Aretinus de
Gambilionibus († 1461) described a case in his tract De maleficiis
in which an assault without witnesses but with much circumstantial evidence was
classified as “indicia indubitata.”[34] Since the thirteenth
century jurists had created hypothetical cases to illustrate how evidence
should be interpreted. Although their opinions varied, they did grant that
“indicia” did not need to be only from direct eye witnesses or confessions.[35]
The trial dragged on and the judges could not conclude
that the evidence was conclusive enough for a conviction. The case was probably
further complicated in the minds of the judges by the rumors that circulated
through the eternal city that Franceso had sexually
assaulted Beatrice continuously.
His “fama” for committing sexual crimes was well known.[36]
Finally Pope
Clement VIII, 5 August, 1599, issued a bull permitting the torture of Lucrezia (as a witness), Beatrice, Giacomo and Bernardo.
Torture quickly brought confessions. Giacomo was tortured with “La corda” on the 7th August, 1599 for one "Credo"
and confessed in the first session.[37] On 9 August, 1599, Lucrezia
was tortured with the “La corda” and confessed that
Beatrice and Olimpio were responsible; Giacomo knew everything. Bernardo was too
young to be tortured, but the pope’s letter put him in the torture chamber as
well. Finally on 10 August, 1599, Beatrice was tortured with the “La corda” for the time that it took to recite an “Ave Maria.”
In the records of the trial she is supposed to have cried out: “Oimé, Oimé o Madonna santissima ajutame. Calateme che voglio
dire la verità (Oh, me, oh,
me, Virgin Mary please help me.
Let me
down and I will tell the truth).” She made a full confession. At this point in the trial, the Cenci sought
out and employed the best criminal lawyer in Rome, Prospero Farinacci.
Farinacci
(1544-1618) had devoted much thought to torture in his extraordinarily detailed
treatment of the subject in his books on criminal procedure. He was probably educated in Perugia and
quickly gained experience on both sides of the bench. In 1567 he became the
general commissioner in the service of the Orsini of Bracciano; the next year he took up residence in Rome as a
member of the papal camera. However, in 1570 he was imprisoned for an unknown
crime. Legal problems hounded him for the rest of his life. He lost an eye in a
fight, was stripped of his positions, and was even accused of sodomy.[38] In spite of his difficulties, Pope Clement
VIII reinstated him to the papal court in 1596.[39]
He began his most important work, Praxis
et theorica criminalis,
in 1581 and put the finishing touches on it by 1601.[40] However, even a brilliant lawyer could not
save Beatrice.
Patricide, even of a
brute, was a crime that could not be excused for reasons that might persuade a
court today (except in Texas and Virginia).
Especially when Pope Clement VIII may have been determined to confiscate
the properties of the Cenci.[41]
Farinacci
and the jurists knew full well that judges did not always follow the norms of
the Ius commune when they ordered
torture in their courtrooms.
In his
treatise, Farinacci quoted Sebastiano Rolandi (ca. 1600) that modern judges substitute
their wills in the place of evidence when they ordered torture. Princes should not tolerate this miscarriage
of justice.[42] He also
reminded his readers that torture should also be inflicted only when there was
sufficient evidence.
Otherwise, the
evidence produced by torture was invalid.[43]
From the
information we have, Farinacci would not have
objected to the court having tortured the Cenci. On the contrary, if they had not been nobles
and women, they would have been tortured when they were first summoned to the
court, or the judges would have considered the evidence “indicia certa et indubitata” if they had
not been members of the noble class.
As it was, Farinacci did not
have much upon which he could build a defense. Perhaps the most interesting
document in the case is a consilium that Farinacci wrote in defense of Beatrice and the other accused.[44]
On the same
day she had been tortured, Beatrice met her lawyer (10 August, 1599). As we
know from his consilium that he must have presented
to the court, Farinacci tried to construct a defense
around Francesco’s brutal treatment of Beatrice and his wife, and his purported
incestuous advances to Beatrice. But there was too little solid evidence. As he
seems to concede in his consilium, Farinacci could make general arguments in Beatrice’s
defense but was not able to offer witnesses who could confirm Beatrice’s
accusations and the rumors. The court questioned why Beatrice did not accuse
her father when the abuse happened and why there was an interval between the
abuse and the murder. Her case would have been much stronger if she had
immediately complained about her father and killed him when he had abused
her. Farinacci
deflected these questions as best he could.[45] In spite of Farinacci’s efforts, Beatrice was convicted of
patricide. On 11 September 1599
Beatrice, Giacomo and Lucrezia were beheaded in the
shadow of the Castel Sant’Angelo. Probably because
Bernardo was only twelve, he was sent to the galleys. The pope confiscated all
the Cenci properties.
The story of Artemisia Gentileschi’s torture during
her trial has been told by historians, novelists, and filmmakers.[46]
Surprisingly,
in spite of the lavish attention which her story has received, some scholars
have misunderstood the role that torture played in her trial. The complete transcript of her trial has been
published.[47]
There are
French and English translations.
Art
historians rediscovered Artemisia and her father, Orazio in the 1980’s. A large exhibition of her and Orazio’s works was greeted with great acclaim in Europe and
North America in the early twentieth century.[48]
Artemisia
painted a number of self-portraits and challenged, and possibly even equaling, Caravaggio’s
vision of Judith and Holofernes with a stunning
painting of her own.[49]
When Artemisia (born in 1593) was in her late teens
and working in her studio, she was visited by Agostino Tassi who had been her father’s friend. He was a painter of mediocre talent who had a
keen interest in Artemisia. She had shown remarkable talent for painting
at an early age. Although she had great talent, Orazio did not school
her; she could read but little and write
not at all.[50]
She began
painting when she was in her teens.
Much
of her work was in the workshop of her father and in collaboration with him. Her earliest known painting of “Susanna and
the Elders,” signed by Artemisia and dated 1610, reveals an artist with her own
style and a mature talent.[51]
The painting
displays so much maturity that scholars have argued about how much of her
father’s brush can be found in it.[52]
Tasso came to Gentileschi’s studio under the pretext,
one unreliable witness stated, of teaching her perspective.[53]
Instead of (or
in addition to) teaching her how to paint, he raped her. Artemisia’s testimony was very
different. She told a story of a woman, Donna
Tuzia, who rented an apartment in Gentileschi’s
house, and who, she claimed, pressed Tassi’s amorous
suit on her. Tuzia
connived to arrange Tassi’s meetings with
Artemisia. Finally, one day Tassi managed to enter Artemisia’s studio where she was
painting a portrait of one of Tuzia’s sons. Tuzia was in the
room but left when Tassi told her to leave. Artemisia was not feeling well. They walked around the room several times,
until Tassi pushed her into her bedroom, locked the
door, threw her on her bed, forced his way through her layers of clothing, and pushed
his penis into her vagina.
In her
testimony to the court at her home Artemisia told the officials of the court
that before Tassi entered her, she had grabbed his
penis with such force that she ripped some skin from it. That did not stop him. After he had ejaculated he told her that he
would marry her as soon as he could arrange his affairs. He warned her that if he married her she
should be a good wife.
Artemisia
confessed that his promise reassured her and that afterwards she had
intercourse with him many times.[54]
He constantly
repeated his promise to marry her. He also gave her a ring to signify his commitment
to Artemisia. She did not know then, she told her questioners, that he already
had a wife.
Tassi’s
crime was “stuprum,” which was the technical term in
the Ius commune term for raping a
virgin. It could be committed only
against virgins and widows who were of good reputation.[55]
Men could also
commit “stuprum” against boys. If it could be proven that a woman had loose
morals, the accusation of “stuprum” could not be
made. If a woman were married and her
morals were unimpeachable she could not accuse her rapist of “stuprum.”
There was
one other significant procedural rule governed trials of “stuprum”: the testimony of one witness could be accepted
by the court instead of the normal two witnesses concerning the rape and the
woman’s reputation.
The penalty of death and definition for “stuprum” were taken from ancient Roman criminal law. In the first half of the twelfth century,
King Roger II of Sicily († 1154) promulgated a constitution that punished men
who committed “stuprum” by death even if they raped
the woman with the intention of marrying them, “unless royal censure decided
otherwise.”[56]
Almost a
century later Emperor Frederick II († 1250) placed Roger’s constitution in his
compilation of laws.
He omitted,
however, Roger’s ameliorating clause that the king might render a judgment
other than death.
In a second constitution
Frederick noted that although there was a custom in the Kingdom of Sicily that
those who raped with the intention to marry the woman were exempted from the
death penalty, he decreed that Roger’s exemption was completely removed.[57]
Marinus de Caramanico noted in
his commentary on Frederick’s Constitutions that although secular law dictated
death, canon law absolved that penalty if the woman’s dissent turned into
assent.[58]
In 1332 King
Robert II of Sicily († 1343) derogated the penalty of death and instituted the
confiscation of property, sparing the children of the perpetrator from losing
their share of the patrimony that was due to them by the law of nature and
Roman law.[59]
Finally, by
the sixteenth century the jurists had decided that the death penalty was
justified if the rape was violent but adopted the canonical norm for rapes that
led to marriage.[60]
When Orazio brought suit against his old friend Agostino Tassi for “stuprum” on behalf of his daughter, his trump card was that
Tassi had not married her. Orazio and Artemisia had waited about nine
months for Tassi to fulfill his promise. When he did not, Orazio took him to
court. It is not clear what Orazio’s purpose was:
marriage or revenge.
The record
cannot be read to justify one or the other conclusion. One conclusion is clear: as long as Tassi
kept promising to marry Artemisia, their continuing sexual congresses brought
no shame to her.[61]
She could hold
her head high, and Orazio could not fault her or Tassi.
Something changed that equilibrium between March 1611
when Artemisia was raped and May 1612 when the trial began. We do not know when the change took place or
what caused it.
It is clear, however,
that Tassi no longer wanted to marry Artemisia. The trial transcript is a lachrymose record
of Tassi’s betrayal of his promise. Artemisia still held some hope that he would
return to her. Even at the end of her
testimony Artemisia gave signs that she would have taken Tassi
back.[62]
The trial transcript reveals two indisputable
points: Tassi
lied and contradicted himself in his testimony, and he suborned witnesses to testify
that Artemisia was a woman of loose morals.
If he had been able to establish her “infamia”
as a woman who had many lovers, the court would have dismissed the charge of “stuprum.”
The major piece
of evidence that convicts Tassi and his witnesses, especially
Nicolò Bedoni, of bearing
false witness were the letters that they claimed she had written. That was a particularly maladroit attempt to
present proof of Artemisia’s loose morals since she could easily prove that she
could not write and could barely read.
The
weakness in Orazio’s accusation was the long time during
which Artemisia and Tassi were lovers. Even if the rape were as violent as Artemisia
described it, the court would not have necessarily convicted Tassi of “stuprum” because of
Artemisia’s acceptance of Tassi as a lover and a
future husband for many months.
Dissent
had evolved into assent, as the jurists would have understood the
situation. That fact would have most
likely wiped Tassi’s slate clean.[63]
One key legal problem remained for Artemisia. Tassi, Bedino and other witnesses had sullied Artemisia’s
reputation. The evidence they presented
to the court would have given her the status of “infamis.”[64]
If Artemisia
were declared “infamis” she would have been vulnerable
to future sexual assaults and would have had no legal recourse. From the court’s point of view she would have
the status of a whore — against whom “stuprum” cannot
be committed. Tassi
and others tried to present exculpatory evidence by giving evidence that
Artemisia was fair game because she had had sexual relations with many
men. Consequently, it was probably clear
to Artemisia and abundantly clear to the court that she must verify her
testimony. She was asked whether she
would submit to the mildest form of torture, the “sibila.” This form of torture was designed for women
and was performed by wrapping a cord around each finger. The cord was then tightened. Artemisia consented to the “sibila.”
Her consent
was necessary because her testimony was consistent. The Ius
commune dictated that witnesses could be tortured only if their testimony
were not consistent.
The trial record is poignantly touching when it
reports Artemisia’s torture.
The court
placed Artemisia and Tassi in the same room and
confronted each with questions about their testimony. The jailer was summoned to place the cord
around each finger.
As the jailer
winched the cord around her fingers, Artemisia called out:[65]
“It is true, it is true, it is true, it is true, it is
true (what I have said).”
(To Tassi) “This is the ring
that you gave to me and these are the promises that you made.”
(Tassi responded) “You lie
through your teeth.”
(Artemisia answered) “It is the true, it is the
truth.”
When Artemisia remained constant in her testimony the
judge commanded that the “sibila” be removed after it
had been applied for one “Miserere.”[66]
Several months later the suborned witness, Nicolò Bedino, was also tortured
with “La corda” because his testimony was so
blatantly inconsistent with the facts and with the testimony of other
witnesses.[67]
He held up
very well under torture.
To every
question put to him, he declared that he had told the truth. The trial record does not tell us whether Tassi was asked to submit to torture. After Bedino was
tortured the trial record seems to have ended.
There was a very good legal reason why there may not be more to the
record than what we have.
Bedino’s testimony had been confirmed by torture; Artemisia had also used torture to validate
her testimony. When confronted with
testimony that we characterize today as “he said, she said,” the court had very
little choice but to end the proceedings without a conviction or a sentence.[68]
How do these cases of torture look to us today in our
distant mirror?
Are they worth our time
reflecting upon?
The reader will
anticipate my answer of “yes.”
In spite
of a distance of several centuries and a different society and legal system,
these cases contain much for us to think about.
The most obvious conclusion is that human beings torture other human
beings only when they feel most threatened.
In our age of nuclear weapons and terrorists have replaced heresy and
magic. From our point of view these former
reasons seem rather quaint to torture anyone.
We also like to think that certain classes of people, like citizens, are
exempt from torture.
The jurisprudence
of the Ius commune also exempted pregnant women, nobles, and children, but as we
have seen, political and economic interests — and fear — could trump those
privileges, as they have in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
These four cases suggest that people have been inclined to believe in the efficacy
of torture as a mode of proof and a means to discover the truth for centuries
(e.g. Baldus, Artemisia), in spite of the evidence to
the contrary (e.g. Nicolò Bedino). But, as the historical record demonstrates
and as jurists over the centuries have argued, torture is a very fallible
instrument for learning the truth.[69]
That is a fact
of which we need, it seems, to be reminded again and again.
[1]
Borrowing from Barbara Tuchman’s
A
Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th
Century (New York 1978). It is not
by chance, however, that the flagship journal of the Medieval Academy of
America is Speculum.
[2]
Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “‘Getting Medieval’:
History and the Torture Memos,” Perspectives on History (American
Historical Association, September 2008) 3-6.
[3]
I have written two essays that discussed the history
of torture:
ATorture and Fear: Enemies of Justice,@
Rivista internazionale di diritto comune 19 (2008) 203-242 and “Torture in
the Ius commune,” Mélanges en l’honneur d’Anne Lefebvre-Teillard, ed.
Bernard d’Alteroche, Florence Demoulin-Auzary, Olivier Descamps, Franck Roumy
(Paris: Éditions Panthéon-Assas, 2009) 813-838. The essays have
overlapping material and contain a condensed version of two of these four trials discussed in this essay (Sibílla and Beatrice). In order, however, to understand the jurists’ thought on torture
completely, it would be necessary to read those essays in conjunction with this
one.
[4]
The infamous rack that I use in my title and which is the subject of
many paintings was often used in punishments or in the imaginations of painters
portraying the grisly deaths of martyrs but never appears, as far as I know, in
court records that provide evidence about the use of torture in the judicial
process.
[5] For
the life and works of Baldus, see my essay, “Baldus de Ubaldis”, Rivista internazionale di diritto comune
8 (1997) 35-61 and Hermann
Lange
and Maximiliane Kriechbaum, Maximiliane, Römisches Recht im Mittelalter,
2: Die Kommentatoren (München
2007) 749-795.
[6] Alberto
Boscolo, Sibílla Fortià regina d’Aragona
(Pubblicazioni dell’Istituto de Storia Medioevale e Moderna dell’Università
degli Studi di Cagliari, 13; Padova 1970) 125-129 and José Maria Roca, La Reyna empordanesa (Barcelona 1928).
My thanks to Adam Kosto for these references. Boscolo doubts whether the story
about
Sibílla is true since it was reported by
a late fifteenth-century source. He conjectures that another Sibílla Fortià,
who was tried for witchcraft ca. 1412-1416, might be the
Sibílla who was tortured (pp. 126-127).
Baldus wrote his consilium before he died in 1400. It is the earliest evidence
for the story, and the date of his consilium confirms the late Spanish source,
a poet named Giacomo Roig († 1478) who said that Queen
Sibílla was tortured.
[7] Biblioteca
ApostolicaVaticana, Barberini lat. 1409,
fol. 95v-96v. The consilia in this
manuscript were written ca. 1400 in the last year of his life. The consilium was printed in the vulgate
edition of Baldus’ Consilia in Book
3, consilium 364. On the editions of
Baldus’ Consilia , see Pennington,
“Baldus” 52-61. Baldus wrote a number of
consilia discussing torture that were cited by later jurists: Book 1.95, 259, Book 3.77, 78, 429, Book
5.97, among others.
[8]
Modern equivalents of older currencies are arbitrary, but several
million contemporary American dollars would not be an exaggeration.
[9] Ibid.:
“Et primo quod in tortura caute illustris regine requiruntur indicia certa et
que non possunt in dubium reuocari utrum sint indicia necne.”
[10] Ibid.
“Et ut dixit Aueroys querere rationem ubi habemus sensum est infirmitas
intellectus. Adeo quidem hoc verum est ut plene conuictus non indigeat
tormentis, quia superfluum est tunc adhibere tormenta.”
[11] Ibid.
“Nam prout proponitur ista illustris domina fuit confessa in tormentis uel
saltim probabili uel necessario metu tormentorum, cui confessioni non est
standum, nisi in confessione perseueretur et cesset terror tormentorum, ut ff.
de question. l.i. § <space> Set ista illustris domina non perseuerauit in
confessione, ymo cum data fuit sibi libertas se excusandi, reuocauit
confessionem, ergo talis confessio cum fuerit reuocata non sufficit, ut C. de
custod. reo l.ii.”
[12] Ibid.
fol. 96r: “Item dicit Albertus Magnus lib. xv. de proprietate rerum quod libera
gens est cui libera mens et libera lingua.”
[13] Ibid.
“Illud enim certum est quod metus iustus est timere crudelitatem uel capitalem
inimicitiam hominis potentis... quod
ex iusta causa metuendi presumitur metus et concussio.”
[14] See
examples of Baldus’ timidity in the texts published in Kenneth Pennington, “The
Authority of the Prince in a Consilium of Baldus de Ubaldis”, Studia in honorem Eminentissimi Cardinalis
Alfonsi M. Stickler, ed. Rosalio Iosepho Card. Castillo Lara (Studia et
Textus Historiae Iuris Canonici 7; Rome 1992) 483-515 at 504 lines 306-309 and
508 lines 409-413, with revisions in the same essay reprinted with corrections
in Popes, Canonists, and Texts 1150-1550
(Collected Studies Series 412; Aldershot 1993).
[15] Vat.
Barb. lat. 1409, fol.96r: “Solutio. Dicendum est quod conscientie regis hoc est
relinquendum cum consilio sanctorum et peritorum timentium Deum. ‘Quia cum rex
iustus sederit supra sedem non aduersabitur ei quicumque malignum’, ut in
epistola Inter claras (quoted from Cod. 1.1.8.5). Sed si relicto bono et
speculo conscientie secus faceret, enormiter peccaret, ut in c. Cum eterni, de
re iud. lib. vi. (VI 2.14.1).”
[16] Ibid.
fol. 196v. The text of the second part of the consilium begins on a new folio and may be an independent text.
[17] (3
Vols. Salamanca: 1555) 7.30, fol. 88r-91r. 7.30.2 covered those persons who
could not normally be tortured. Included in the list of exempt persons were
doctors of laws. The author of the ordinary gloss, Gregorio López de Tovar
(1496-1560), remarked sarcastically that s.v. maestro de las leyes: “Nota bene quod Doctores non debent torqueri
et de iure communi non reperies legem ita clare hoc exprimentem. Doctores tamen
ita dicebant.” See Las Siete Partidas,
translated by Samuel Parsons Scott, edited by Robert I. Burns (5 Vols. The
Middle Ages; Philadelphia 2001) 5.1458-1462.
[18]
See the recent overview of the literature and the
complex historical situation in which generalizations are difficult, by Malcolm
Gaskill, “The Pursuit of Reality: Recent Research into the Hisstory
of Witchcraft,” The Historical Journal 51 (2008) 1069-1088. Also Raisa Maria Tovio,
Witchcraft and
Gender in Early Modern Society: Finland
and the Wider European Experience (Aldershot
2008), Edward Bever, “Witchcraft
Prosecutions and the Decline of Magic,” Journal
of Interdisciplinary History 40 (2009) 263-293. There is a large anthropological
literature. A recent intriguing example
of the dangerous woman in Brazil is described by Kelly E. Hayes, “Wicked Women
and Femmes Fatales: Gender, Power, and Pomba Gira in Brazil, History of Religions 48 (2008) 1-21.
[19] Baldus,
loc. cit.: “Illud etiam constat quod in
maleficiis non priuilegiatur dignitas .
. . Quinimmo honor aggrauat
maleficium.”
[20]
Ibid.: “An autem sit possibile
quod aliqui malefici noceant hominibus per incantationem et an possint immutare sensum ipsius? Dicendum est quod sic, permittente Deo, cuius iudicia occulta nescimus.”
[22]
The validity of confessions outside the courtroom had been debated since
the twelfth century; see my essay “The Beginning of Roman Law Jurisprudence
and Teaching in the Twelfth Century: The
Authenticae,” Rivista internazionale di diritto comune 22 (2011) nn. 48-58.
[23]
Pennington,
"A Note to Decameron
6.7: The Wit of Madonna
Filippa," Speculum 52 (1977)
902-905; Boccaccio tells the story of a
Florentine woman who was accused of adultery but who had been caught in
“flagrante delicto.”
[24]
Baldus de Ubaldis, Consilia 5.427
(Milan 1494) unfoliated, (Lyon 1550) fol. 81r: “Quedam mulier nomine domina Mita, uxor cuiusdam Mutii, fuit accusata de adulterio per virum suum et contra eam inducitur unus testis deponens super facti veritate, et tres testes asserentes ipsam feceisse quamdam confessionem extra iudicium coram presbytero, quorum testium duo probantur: unus pater, alter frater accusatoris. Queritur an faciant indicium ad torturam sufficiens?”
[25]
Ibid.: “Videtur certum quod ista mulier est suspectissima ratione temporis quia tenebre noctis aptiores sunt.”
[26] Ibid.:
“et si queritur amice ad quid venisti, non est bona excusatio nec verisimilis
quod fuerit (iuerit edd.), nisi ad
malefaciendum, iuxta illud qui male agit, odit lucem.”
[27]
Ibid.: “Ad hoc textum qui dicit
quod ex confessione extra iudicium facta, parte absente, cum uno teste de veritate probatur vehemens aminiculum, ut extra de succes. ab intest.
c. Cum dilectus (X 3.27.3). Item delicta que fiunt in domo probantur per domesticos, ut C. de repud. l. Consenu (Cod. 5.17.8).
[28]
Ibid.: “Quibus rationibus et aliis que iuste possunt allegari motus puto quod iuste fuerit pronunciatum mulierem torquendam esse et interrogandam . . . Dicet aliquis suspectis testibus non creditur, sed isti sunt suspecti quia consanguinei accusatoris . . . Sed hoc non obstante quia non agitur hic de proprio interesse, puto quantum ad
indicia verum esse quod dixi quia multi testes in eamdem sententiam consonant et quia adultterium totam cognationem denigrat et maculat. Porro de tormentis non potest dari una determinitata regula quia valde consistunt in arbitrio iusdicentis cuius fidei et auctoritati negotium discutiendum committitur.”
[29]
Three essays in
The
Politics of Law in Late Medieval and Renaissance Italy, ed. Lawrin Armstrong
and Julius Kirshner (Toronto Studies in Medieval Law, 1; Toronto-Buffalo-London
201) discuss the legal process of sindicatio.
[30]
Pennington, “Torture and Fear” 220-221.
[31]
Baldus de Ubaldis, Consilia 5.427
(Milan 1494) unfoliated, (Lyon 1550) fol. 81r: “At om questione proposita nos videmus quod per motionem et vestigia pedum significatur qualitas lupporum et vulpium. Sic dico in proposito per ambulare de nocte ad loca suspecta et per personas suspectas et a suspitionibus
torture ceperunt et necessarie sunt, ut C. de dolo, Dolum, in verbo ‘ex persipicis inditiis’ et ex semita pedum congoscitur ude transivit latro
(Cod. 2.20[21]6).” The citation to the Codex
does not support Baldus’ point, except in the most general
way.
[32] Ibid.: “Conclusio
est quod dicta mulier debet torqueri, sed si perseveret in tormentis et semper neget
purgata est per susceptionem tormentorum et debet absolvi tanquam non probatum.”
[33] See
Beatrice Cenci: La storia il mito,
ed. Mario Bevilacqua and Elisbetta Mori
(Rome 1999) 61-79, whose bibliography cites the older, extensive
literature. See also Belinda Jack, Beatrice’s Spell: The Enduring Legend of Beatrice Cenci (London
2004), whose account is not always accurate.
[34] Cited
by Richard Fraher, “Conviction According to Conscience: The Medieval Jurists’
Debate Concerning Judicial Discretion and the Law of Proof,” Law and History Review 7 (1989) 23-88 at
55. On Angelus and his works, see Domenico and Paola Maffei, Angelo Gambiglioni: Giureconsulto Aretino
del Quattrocento: La vita, i libri, le opere (Biblioteca della Rivista di
Storia del Diritto Italiano, 34. Roma 1994), especially p. 57-64 and 95-102.
[35] Ibid.
41-42 and 56. See also Gandinus’ discussions of “indicia indubitata” in Hermann
U. Kantorwicz, Albertus Gandinu und das
Straftrecht der Scholastik (2 vols.
Berlin-Leipzig 1907-1926, reprinted 1978)
2.90-98.
[36]
For the important of “fama” in criminal trials
see Federico Migliorino,
Fama e
infamia: Problemi della società
medievale nel pensiero giuridico nei secoli XII e XIII (Catania1985).
[37] “La corda” was the most
commonly used type of torture in the pre-modern period. It consisted of raising the victim by a rope from
the victim’s wrists that were tied behind his or her back. The earliest illustration of La corda is a splendid illumination in
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana lat. 1430, fol.
179r, Justinian's Codex, Book 6, title 1, Chapters 1-4, ca. 1325-1350, under
the title, De fugitivis servis. The image can be viewed at:
http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/CUA%20Judges/CriminaImpunita.htm
The severity of the torture with “La corda” was regulated by the length of time the victim must
endure it. The judge would instruct the
torturer to inflict the torture for the length of time needed to recite a
common liturgical prayer.
[38] When
Giuseppe Cesari painted Farinacci s portrait ca. 1600 (Rome, Museo Nazionale di
Castel Sant Angelo) he quite deliberately and obviously posed him to leave his
left eye in the shadows. See portraits
of Farinacci and Beatrice at:
http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/SantaBarbaraTorture/Farinacci2.htm
http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/SantaBarbaraTorture/Farinacci3.htm
http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/SantaBarbaraTorture/Cenci1.htm
[39] See
Beatrice Cenci: La storia, il mito.
[40] A.
Mazzacane, “Farinacci, Prospero (1544-1618)”, Juristen: Ein biographisches Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20.
Jahrhundert, ed. Michael Stolleis (München 1995) 199-200; Niccolò Del Re,
“Prospero Farinacci giureconsulto romano (1544-1618),” Archivio della Società Romana di Storia Patria, 3rd
series 28 (1975) 135-220. Mazzacane writes that he completed it in 1614, but an
edition of Praxis et theoricae criminalis
was published in Venice: apud Georgium Variscum, 1603 (in fine 1601), which is
described as the third edition, with additions made by the author to the first
and second editions, see Antichi testi giuridici
(secoli XV-XVIII) dell’Istituto di Storia del Diritto Italiano, ed.
Giuliana Sapori (Università degli Studi di Milano, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto
di Storia del Diritto Italiano, 7; Milan 1977) 1.242, no. 1162.
[41]
Irene Fosi, Papal Justice: Subjects and
Courts in the Papal State, 1500-1750, trans. Thomas V. Cohen (Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University Press of
America, 2011) 87-88 overstates Pope Clement VIII “ruthlessness” and his
“thirsting for blood and money.” As my
description of the case makes clear, this was not an unbridled rush to
judgment.
[42]
Prrospero Farinacci, Praxis criminalis libri duo (Frankfurt am Main: 1606 and 1622 [these
editions have the same pagination]) Book 1, title 5, Quaetio
37, p. 575: “Roland. consilium
12. num. 31 volum. 3, ubi testatur de magis communi opinione, et num 34, ubi valde invehit contra iudices modernos,
qui suum velle loco indiciorum subrogantes ut plurimum velo levato homines
torquent, dicitque tales iniquos iudices minime fore a superioribus et Principibus
tolerandos, Clarus <Giulio Claro> in practica <Practica criminalis> § finali quaest. 64 versi. “dixi etiam” ad
medium, ubi quod ex Bologn. in addit. ad Guid. de Suzar. in tract. de torment.
num 29. nullus discrepat a proposita regula.
Idem Claus ibid. in versi. “dixi quoque,” ubi admonet iudices Deum
timentes, ut semper prae oculis habeant, ne aliquem tormentis subiiciant non
solum sine iudiciis, sed nec etiam cum indiciis nisi legitima et sufficientia
fuerit.”
[43]
Farinacci repeats again
and again that confessions made under torture are invalid if there are not
“indicia sufficientia,” e.g. Ibid. p. 587: “Vt sine
legitimis praecedentibus indiciis iudex, nec leviter quidem potest reum
torquere, immo nec terrere, quia metus torquendi aequparatur torturae, et paria
sunt quem confiteri per torturam vel metu torturae . . .
quod torquendi metus dicitur incussus reo si fuerit ligatus ad torturam, vel fuerit ductus ante eam, vel si
minae de torquendo praecesserunt, vel si fuerit spoliatus ante torturam, etiam
quod non ligatus . . .
iudex, sicut non potest torquere sine indiciis, ita etiam nec potest terrere
per minas, seu alio modo. . . etiam testatur de communi opinione . .
. quod sicut iudex non potest
sine praecedentibus indiciis reum torquere, ita pariter nec poterit terrere, et
multo minus leviter torquere, et si torqueat vel terreat, confessio subsequens
tanquam metu torturae extorta nihil operatur.
Et ita sine dubio se habet magis communis dominorum opinio.” One of the consequences of juristic thought
and norms was that torture was used much less frequently in medieval and early
modern courts than scholars have thought; see Pennington, “Torture and Fear”
226-227 and passim.
[44] Prospero Farinacci, Consilia sive responsa
atque decisiones causarum criminalium (Colonia 1649) Consilium 66, p. 418-
[45]
Prospero Farinacci, Consilia sive
responsa atque decisiones causarum criminalium, Tomus Primus (Cologne:
1649), consilium 66, pp. 418-419: “licet Beatrix Cincia Francisci patris necem
impie procuraverit, si tamen verum est .
. . et male tractando illius
pudicitiam violare tentaverit . . . Ergo multo magis excusanda videatur
Beatrix, quae patrem delinquentem et stuprum committere volentem occidit . . Nec
dicat fiscus, quod si Beatrix tentata fuit de stupro a patre, debebat patrem
non occidere, sed accusare . . . Nec etiam dicat idem fiscus (prout sic
dicentem mihi ipsi illum videre videor) quod praedicta omnia procedunt, si
Beatrix tempore tentati seu commissi stupri in ipsum manus intulisset; secus
autem si ex intervallo.” Farinacci then defended Beatrice with complicated
arguments about when patricide is justified.
See below for a definition of “stuprum” in the Ius commune.
[46] An excellent
study by Mary D. Garrard, Artemisia Gentileschi: The Image of
the Female Hero in Italian Baroque Art (Princeton,
New Jersey 1989); Elizabeth S. Cohen,
“The Trials of Artemisia Gentileschi: A
Rape as History,” Sixteenth Century
Journal 31 (2000) 47-75; A novel by
Alexandra Lapierre, Artemisia: Un duel pour l’immortalité (Paris 1998, translated into English by
Liz Heron, London-New York 2000) and a
film that significantly distorts the story,
Artemisia, directed by Agnes
Merlet (French 1998).
[47] The
transcript of the trial in Rome, Archivio di Stato, Tribunale Criminale del Governatore di Roma,
processo 7, busta 104, pp. 1-340 and has been printed by Eva Menzio, Artemisia
Gentileschi Lettere precedute da Atti di un processo per stupro(Milan 1981; reprinted Carte d'Aristi, 55;
Milan 2004; translated into French by Marie-Anne Toledano, Actes d'un
procès pour viol en 1612 suivis des lettres de Artemisia Gentileschi Paris
1983). A very good English translation
was published by Garrard, Artemisia Gentileschi, Appendix B pp.
403-487.
[48] Keith
Christiansen and Judith W. Mann, Orazio
and Artemisia Gentileschi (New Haven-London 2001), the catalogue for
exhibitions in Rome, October 2001 to January 2002, New York February-May 2002,
and Saint Louis June-September 2002.
[49]
Examples of Artemisia’s work can be seen at:
http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/SantaBarbaraTorture/GentileschiJudithComparison.html
[50]
She responded to the judges about letters that she was accused of writing:
“io non so scrivere et poco leggere,” Garrard,
, Artemisia Gentileschi 463.
[51]
Displayed in the New York and Saint Louis exhibitions; Orazio and Artemisia no. 51,
pp. 296-299.
[52]
Mann, “Artemisia and Orazio Gentileschi,” Orazio
and Artemisia 249-281 at 253.
[53]
The witness, Nicolò Bedino,
had been an apprentice of Orazio Gentileschi. His testimony was clearly
suborned.
[54]
Cohen’s ruminations, “Trials of Artemisia” 72, that Artemisia was angry at her father
because “he did not respond promptly or ardently” to her rape misreads the
case; Cohen would be right if Artemisia
had rejected Tassi’s offer to marry her.
[55]
I find Elizabeth Cohen’s analysis of the rape and the trial unpersuasive
in general, but most importantly for this essay she also does not understand
norms of the Ius commune and the
procedural rules that governed trials of “stuprum.” Among other matters that I will point out
below, she thinks that the indictment of stuprum can
only be brought in rapes where the woman is a virgin; “Trials of Artemisia” 59.
[56]
Ortensio Zecchino,
ed. Le assise di Ariano: Testo critico, traduzione e note (Cava dei
Tirreni 1984) 34.
[57] Wolfgang
Stürner, ed. Die
Konstitutionen Friedrichs II. für das Königreich Sizilien. (Monumenta Germaniae Historica,
Constitutiones et Acta Publica imperatorum et Regum, 2 Supplementum. Hannover
1996) 173-174.
[58]
Marinus de Caramanico,
Commentary toConstitutiones Frederici secundi (ca. 1278-1285),ed.
Lyon: 1534, Book 1 Title 20, fol. 49-50: s.v. Si
quis rapere: Haec constitutio quae punit raptores sacrarum virginum continet ius commune. Title 22: s.v. Capitalem: Sed iure canonico secus est, quia potest contrahere rapta eum raptore si prior dissensus transeat in consensum, ut extra de rapt. c. Accedens,
cum suis similibus (X
5.17.7).
[59]
King
Robert II of Anjou, Statutum 26 October, 1332: “Iubemus expressius contra delinquentem in huiusmodi casibus . . . ad punitionem condignam et debitam
. . . quod si comparuerit
in iudicio evocatus et convictus fuerit probatione legitima digna sententia condemnetur . . . Si fuerit
paterfamilias hic delinquens bona omnia
tam mobilia quam immobilia
. . . fisci nostri commodis protinus applicentur. Legitima tamquam iure naturae debita eius filiis si
quos habet . . . sine diminutione servata,” Capitula regni utriusque Siciliae ritus magnae curiae vicariae et pragmaticae (Neapoli
1773) 116-119.
[60]
Tommaso Grammatico, Additiones et apostillae
super Constitutionibus Regni utriusque Siciliae (Venetiis 1562) to Book 1 Title 20, fol. 19r: “Et quod requiritur interventus violentiae ad hoc, ut poena capitis locum habeat in raptu . .
. et quod poena iuris civilis hodie sit sublata per ius canonicum subsequuto matrimonio tenet pulchre Lucas de
Penna in versiculo 'Mulieres' versiculo 'Sic dicimus' C. de incolis lib. 10
[Cod. 10.40(39).9]. Grammatico
(† 1556) was a distinguished sixteenth-century jurist who recorded a number of
cases of ‘stuprum” in his writings.
[61]
Cohen, “Trials of Artemisia” 58, does not understand that the long
standing custom established in the Ius commune of allowing women to marry their
rapist was not negated by the Council of Trent.
Trent only decreed that marriages must take place “in facie ecclesiae.” The norms of the Church were not “rigorous”
in this case.
[62]
This is the one point that the film about Artemisia gets right.
[63]
Cohen, “Trials of Artemisia” 66-71 completely misinterprets the law and
the record.
[64] See in
general
Migliorino, Fama e
infamia passim and in particular Edward Peters, “Wounded Names: The Medieval Doctrine of Infamy,” Law in Medieval Life and
Thought, eds. Edward B. King and Susan J. Ridyard. (Swannee 1990) 43-89.
[65]
Garrard, Artemisia Gentileschi 462 and Lapierre, Artemisia (French edition) 451: “Tunc dominus mandavit per custodem carcerum accomodari sibila et iunctis manibus ante pectus et inter singulos digitos sibilis accomodatis de more et secundum ususum . . . coepit dicta adduca dicere: ‘é vero, é vero, é vero, é vero,” pluries atque pluries praedicata verba replicando et posteas dixit: ‘Questo é l’annello che tu
mi dai et queste sone le promesse.’ . .
. Interrogante dicto adducto et dicente: ‘Non é vero, tu ne mente per la gola.’ Replicante dicta adducta: ‘é vero, é vero, é vero.’ Dominus ambabus in eorum dicta permanentibus mandavit disligari sibila et amoveri e manibus, cum stetisset accomodata per spatium unius “Miserere,” et deinde licentiavit dictam adductam.”
[66]
Persons were tortured for the length of a prayer: An “Ave Maria,” a “Pater Noster,”
or in this case, a short “Miserere nobis.” Garrard mistranslates this sentence because
the editors of the text put a period in the wrong place.
[67]
Garrard, Artemisia Gentileschi 487.
Garrard, p. 405, interprets the evidence that Bedino
was also tortured with the “sibila.” The text clearly states that the device was
La corda. “Sibila” was only used for women, the weak, the young, and
minor crimes.
[68]
Cohen, “Trials of Artemisia” 72, asserts that Tassi
was convicted of “stuprum.” There is no evidence for her conclusion. “Stuprum” was a
very serious crime and still could carry the death penalty in the sixteenth
century. Other penalties included exile
and fines. If Tassi
had been convicted, there would have been a punishment. However, from what we know about Tassi after the trial, there was none.
[69]
I refer to my essays cited in footnote 3 in which I make an extended
argument to justify this generalization.